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Abstract
The goal of this article is to investigate how human participants allocate their limited time to decisions with
different properties. We report the results of two behavioral experiments. In each trial of the experiments,
the participant must accumulate noisy information to make a decision. The participants received positive
and negative rewards for their correct and incorrect decisions, respectively. The stimulus was designed such
that decisions based on more accumulated information were more accurate but took longer. Therefore,
the total outcome that a participant could achieve during the limited experiments’ time depended on her
“decision threshold”, the amount of information she needed to make a decision. In the first experiment, two
types of trials were intermixed randomly: hard and easy. Crucially, the hard trials were associated with
smaller positive and negative rewards than the easy trials. A cue presented at the beginning of each trial
would indicate the type of the upcoming trial. The optimal strategy was to adopt a small decision threshold
for hard trials. The results showed that several of the participants did not learn this simple strategy. We
then investigated how the participants adjusted their decision threshold based on the feedback they received
in each trial. To this end, we developed and compared 10 computational models for adjusting the decision
threshold. The models differ in their assumptions on the shape of the decision thresholds and the way the
feedback is used to adjust the decision thresholds. The results of Bayesian model comparison showed that a
model with time-varying thresholds whose parameters are updated by a reinforcement learning algorithm is
the most likely model. In the second experiment, the cues were not presented. We showed that the optimal
strategy is to use a single time-decreasing decision threshold for all trials. The results of the computational
modeling showed that the participants did not use this optimal strategy. Instead, they attempted to detect
the difficulty of the trial first and then set their decision threshold accordingly.
Keywords: Sequential sampling models, opportunity cost, reward rate maximization, speed-accuracy
trade-off, reinforcement learning.
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1. Introduction
Suppose you are taking an exam. You have one hour to answer as many questions as you can. In addition,
suppose that there are two types of questions, easy and hard. How much time should you spend on each
question? For example, if the questions are presented sequentially and the first question is hard, would you
be willing to spend 10 minuets on that question? In this scenario, every moment that one spends on one
question, less will remain for other questions and so fewer questions can be answered in limited time. On
the other hand, by answering the questions too fast, the accuracy drops and one may be able to answer only
a few questions correctly. This results in a trade-off between the speed and the accuracy.
This is an example of a more general problem in which a living organism has to allocate a limited resource
to different courses of actions. Some examples of a limited resource are: energy, time, memory, attention
and so on. Usually, spending more of the resource on a course of action results in more desirable outcome
for those actions. However, spending more of the resource on some actions leaves less for the other actions,
and this may result in lower total outcome. Therefore, the organism must allocate the resource “wisely” to
obtain the maximum total outcome from all actions.
A situation in which this sort of trade-off arises naturally is perceptual decision making in which the
animal has to make decisions based on noisy information. Usually, by spending more time the animal can
make more accurate decisions which in turn lead to more desirable outcomes. A large amount of research
has focused on explaining the relationship between the decision time and the accuracy in perceptual decision
making, both theoretically and experimentally Ratcliff (1978); Townsend & Ashby (1983); Ratcliff et al.
(1999); Smith (2000); Usher & McClelland (2001); Brown & Heathcote (2005); Gold & Shadlen (2002);
Kiani et al. (2008); Teodorescu & Usher (2013); Jones & Dzhafarov (2014); Khodadadi & Townsend (2015).
The most popular theoretical framework for explaining the mechanism underlying this relationship is pro-
vided by a class of models known as sequential sampling models. A common assumption between different
instantiations of these models is that the animal sequentially samples evidence favoring each of the possible
decisions. Since these samples are noisy, a decision based on one sample will be very inaccurate. Instead,
the brain accumulates these samples until the accumulated evidence favoring one of the decisions reaches a
specific level called the decision threshold. Larger values of the decision threshold lead to slower but more
accurate decisions. The rate at which the information is accumulated is proportional to the difficulty of the
stimulus and so it is controlled by the experimenter and not the participant.
Experimental results together with computational modeling have shown that human participants adjust
the value of their decision threshold in response to the emphasis on the speed or the accuracy in the
instructions of the experiment Luce (1986); Ratcliff (2002); Wagenmakers et al. (2008); Forstmann et al.
(2010). This experimental paradigm, provides evidence that human participants can adjust their decision
threshold when they are asked to do so. However, it does not show if this threshold adjustment will occur
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in order to maximize the outcome. Recently, some theoretical and experimental work has investigated
this question. Gold and Shadlen Gold & Shadlen (2002) proposed an experimental paradigm in which
the participants had to make a sequence of decisions during a limited time. The participants received
some rewards or punishments for their correct or incorrect decisions. Since time is limited, the participant
should balance between her speed and accuracy to achieve the maximum amount of reward during the
experiment. Bogacz and his colleagues Bogacz et al. (2006) investigated the optimal strategies in this
paradigm. Specifically, they showed the relationship between the optimal value of the decision threshold and
the parameters of the experiment including the difficulty of the stimulus and the value of the reward and
punishment. More recently, Simen et al. (2009) and Balci et al. (2011) examined experimentally if human
participants can learn the optimal decision threshold in this paradigm.
These studies have shed light on several aspects of the decision making mechanisms involved in balanc-
ing between speed and accuracy in information accumulation paradigms. However, many questions have
remained unanswered. In this paper, we extend the previous research in several directions in order to
investigate some of these questions. We outline these directions next.
1.1. A novel stimulus and decision paradigm
The speed-accuracy trade-off have been mainly investigated using perceptual decision making paradigms.
These experiments are appealing because it is easy to manipulate the difficulty of the task to achieve a wide
range of accuracy (from chance level to perfect accuracy) and reaction time. However, using these stimuli
for studying the properties of the decision thresholds have several drawbacks. First, in the tasks which are
commonly used to study perceptual decision making, for example the random dot motion experiment Britten
et al. (1992); Shadlen & Newsome (2001), neither the accumulated information nor the decision threshold are
directly observable. The only observable variables are the participants’ choice and reaction time in each trial.
Therefore, to infer the properties of the decision threshold in these experiments, one should either use the
neuro-physiological data Shadlen & Newsome (2001); Ratcliff et al. (2007); Kiani et al. (2008); Ivanoff et al.
(2008); Forstmann et al. (2010), or computational modeling Ratcliff (1978); Smith (1995); Ratcliff & Smith
(2004); Usher & McClelland (2001). This makes the inference about the properties of the decision thresholds
harder than if the decision threshold could be observed directly. Second, for the same level of task difficulty,
there is usually a large amount of variations in the participants’ performance. This is due to individual
differences in perceiving the same stimulus. In the language of the sequential sampling models, for the same
stimulus, the participants have different rate of information accumulation. For this reason, the properties
of he optimal decision threshold will be different for different participants. Third, there is usually a large
perceptual learning effect in these tasks. With experience, the rate of information accumulation increases for
a participant. Therefore, the properties of the optimal decision threshold changes for a participant during
the experiment. Fourth, the participants’ average reaction time in these experiments is usually very short.
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As we will argue later, this may put some constraints on the shape of the decision thresholds.
To address these issues, we propose a new stimulus and decision paradigm. Using this stimulus, we are
able to observe the decision threshold and the rate of information accumulation in each trial directly. Also,
since the rate of information accumulation is controlled by the experimenter, the optimal decision threshold
will be the same for all participants and will not change during the experiment.
1.2. Allocation of time to decisions with different properties
In all aforementioned studies on speed-accuracy trade-off, it is assumed that the participants adopt only
one decision threshold in all trials and they adjust it during the experiment. In particular, in each block of
these experiments, all trials had the same level of difficulty. Also, the reward and punishment associated
with the correct and incorrect responses, were the same for all trials in a block. Therefore, to be optimal,
the participant needs to set only one decision threshold for all trials. However, as our first example suggests,
in many real life situations, one needs to allocate time between decisions with different properties. Not only
the difficulty of the decisions may differ (as in the exam example mentioned above), but also their expected
outcomes may differ. Sometimes, harder decisions are associated with higher stakes. For example, publishing
a paper in a higher-impact journal has larger outcome, but the likelihood of rejection is also higher. The
reverse is also the case in many situations. For example, for an animal seeking for food, finding a larger
fruit is easier and its outcome is obviously higher. When the animal has to allocate time between decisions
with different properties, it may be optimal to set different decision thresholds for each type of decisions.
Behaving optimally in these situations is much harder because to know how much time should be spent on
one decision, one should have an estimate of the expected outcome of other decisions.
In this paper, we extend the aforementioned experimental design to situations in which the participants
have to make a sequence of decisions with different properties. Experiments A reported below consists of 40
blocks of trials. The blocks duration is fixed (one minute) and so the number of trials in each block depends
on the participant’s speed in responding in each trial. The participants receive positive (negative) reward
for their correct (incorrect) decisions in each trial. Each trial could be either an “easy” or “hard” trial.
Obviously, in the easy trials, detecting the correct response is easier than the hard trials. In addition, the
easy trials are associated with higher absolute values of both positive and negative reward. We will show
the relationship between the experiments’ parameters (including the values of the rewards, the difficulty
level of the trials and so on) and the average time that should be spent on each trial in order to achieve
the maximum amount of expected total outcome. We chose the values of the experiments’ parameters such
that to be optimal (i.e., to achieve the maximum possible total outcome) the participant must adopt a much
lower value of the decision threshold for the hard trials than the easy trials.
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1.3. Computational models of threshold adjustment
Previous research on rewarded perceptual decision making experiments have mainly focused on the “op-
timal speed-accuracy trade-off”, specifically, quantifying the optimal behavior and examining if the par-
ticipants can learn this optimal behavior Bogacz et al. (2006); Frazier & Yu (2008); Simen et al. (2009);
Balci et al. (2011); Karlar et al. (2014); Khodadadi et al. (2014). However, little is known about how the
participants adjust their decision threshold in these experiments. Our main focus in this paper is on this
question. We attempt to develop computational models that can explain how the participants adjust their
decision threshold after receiving the feedback in each trial.
We will consider several computational models which differ in their assumptions on two dimensions: first,
the shape of the decision thresholds, and second, how the feedback is used to adjust the decision thresholds.
We explain each of these briefly next.
An important aspect of any computational model for information accumulation experiments is its as-
sumption about the form of the decision threshold. Traditional sequential sampling models assume that
the decision threshold remains constant within a trial. More recently, researchers have considered models
with decision thresholds that change as a function of the elapsed time in a trial Ditterich (2006); Fra-
zier & Yu (2008); Churchland et al. (2008); Drugowitsch et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2014); Khodadadi &
Townsend (2015). Specifically, the time-varying decision thresholds have been shown to be optimal in sev-
eral experimental designs. To investigate the form of the decision thresholds used by the participants in
our experiments, we will consider two implementations of each of the computational models: one with time-
constant decision threshold and one with time-varying decision threshold. Interestingly, our results showed
that the time-varying version of each model fitted better than the time-constant version.
To model the mechanisms for adjusting the decision thresholds, we consider four categories of models:
baseline models in which no learning occurs, models that adjust threshold only based on the rewards and
ignore the time, models which assume the participant tries to achieve desired levels of accuracy and reaction
time, and the reinforcement learning models.
Perhaps the reinforcement learning (RL) theory is the most commonly computational framework for
describing the learning mechanisms in value-based decision making studies Sutton & Barto (1998); Daw
(2003); Dayan & Daw (2008). In this framework, if the total outcome depends only on the rewards in
each trial, the experiment can be modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP). This is the most common
application of the RL theory in modeling the learning behavior of human participants O’Doherty et al. (2004);
Daw et al. (2011); Dezfouli & Balleine (2013). In our experiments, however, the total outcome depends on
both the rewards and the reaction times in each trial. Therefore, the MDP framework is not appropriate
for our application. Instead, we will model our experiments as semi-Markov decision processes (SMDP),
an extension of the MDPs in which it is possible to incorporate the effect of the decision times in the total
5
outcome. We then develop RL algorithms for adjusting the decision thresholds in the corresponding SMDPs.
The results of comparing the models showed that, although there are individual differences, the RL models
provide the best fit to the data of most of the participants in Experiment A.
1.4. Time at which decision thresholds are set
Another important aspect that affects the performance in the speed-accuracy trade-off paradigms is the
time at which the decision thresholds are set. Conventional sequential sampling models assume that the
participants set their decision threshold at the beginning of the trial and before the stimulus is presented.
Therefore, in fitting these models to data from experiments in which trials with different levels of difficulty
are intermixed and there is no cue for the participants to know the difficulty level of a trial before the stimulus
is presented, it is assumed that the participants use the same decision threshold for all trials Ratcliff et al.
(1999); Ratcliff (2002); Ratcliff & Smith (2004).
In our Experiment A, a cue presented at the beginning of each trial would indicate the condition (easy
or hard) of the upcoming trial. Therefore, the participant could set two different decision thresholds for the
trials from the two conditions. To test the assumption that the participants set their decision threshold at
the beginning of the trial, in Experiment B the cues were not presented. Other parameters of this experiment
were similar to Experiment A. If this assumption is valid, the participants may use two different thresholds
for the two types of trials in experiment A, but they must use the same threshold for all trials in Experiment
B. We will show that the optimal strategy is to use two different time-constant thresholds for easy and hard
trials in Experiment A, and one time-decreasing threshold for all trials in Experiment B. Another possibility,
however, is that the participants in Experiment B use a mechanism to detect the difficulty of the trial (by
observing the stimulus for some time after the beginning of the trial) and then set the decision threshold
accordingly. We will develop computational models to capture each of these strategies and compare them
to investigate which strategy can describe the participants’ data better. The results of model comparison
provided strong evidence for the assumption that the participants try to detect the difficulty of the trials
first and set the decision threshold accordingly.
2. Material and Methods
2.1. Behavioral experiments
For both experiments reported below, we used a novel stimulus. This stimulus was inspired by this video:
. At the beginning of each trial, a canoe is shown at the center of the screen (panel (a) in Figure 1). After
the trial begins, the canoe moves back and forth, to the right and left. The participants were told that the
canoe will eventually reach one of the two flags on the right and left. In each trial, the participant must
watch the canoe for a while and decide which direction the canoe will eventually go. We call this task the
canoe movement detection task.
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The movement of the canoe was governed by a Markov chain with probability P0. To explain this, suppose
that in a trial the “correct” direction is right. After the trial starts, for ∆t msec, the canoe will move to the
right with probability P0 or moves to the left with probability 1− P0. Again, during the next ∆t msec the
canoe moves to the right or left with the same probabilities. The canoe continues moving in this manner
until the participant makes her decision. The Markov chain corresponding to this movement is shown in
panel (b) of Figure 1. In experiments below we set ∆t = 500 msec which resulted in smooth movement of
the canoe. In each trial, the participants responded by pressing the “c” or “m” keys on the keyboard if they
decided that the canoe is moving to the left or right, respectively. The stimulus was presented on 17” Dell
monitors controlled by Dell Optiplex 990 computers using the Psychophysics Toolbox in MATLAB Brainard
(1997).
In contrast to the experiments which are commonly used to study perceptual decision making, in the
current experiment, both the accumulated information and the decision threshold are observable. At any
moment within a trial, the only relevant information to make a correct decision (detecting the correct
direction of the canoe) is the position of the canoe at that moment. This is because the canoe movement
is governed by a Markov chain and the probability of moving to right or left at any moment is independent
of the canoe position and the elapsed time. Therefore, the canoe position at any moment is equivalent to
the accumulated information in a sequential probability ratio test. In the sequential sampling models, it is
assumed that the participant responds whenever the accumulated information exceeds a decision threshold.
Similarly, we assume that in each trial of our experiment the participant responds whenever the canoe
position deviates from the center of the screen (the initial position of the canoe) by a specific amount. Based
on this assumption, in each trial, the canoe position at the time that the participant responds is the decision
threshold in that trial.
In this paper, we will consider both time-constant and time-varying decision thresholds. Figure 2 shows
a sample path of the canoe position in a trial and an example of time-decreasing thresholds. In this figure,
the horizontal axis is the elapsed time in a trial and the vertical axis is the canoe position, in pixels, relative
to the center of the screen. Positions right to the center are considered as positive. As it can be seen, the
canoe position has first reached the upper decision threshold at t0 = 8.2 secs when the canoe position was
at 112 pixels. Of course, we cannot observe the whole form of the decision threshold in the trial. Instead,
the position of the canoe at the time the participant made her decision in a trial, gives us the value of the
decision threshold at that time. We recorded the participants’ choice (left or right), the decision time and
the value of the decision threshold at the decision time for all trials. In later sections, we will show how we
can use these data to infer the shape of the decision thresholds that a participant has used.
Since the canoe position is equivalent to the accumulated information, the difficulty of a trial is determined
by the value of P0: for large values of this parameter, the canoe moves more consistently toward the correct
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Canoe movement detection task (a) Example screen (b) Markov chain governing the canoe
movement in each trial. In this figure, the correct direction is right. At each time step, the canoe moves to
right with probability P0 and to left with probability 1− P0.
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Figure 2: Sample path of canoe movement. The black curve shows the sample path of the canoe
movement in a trial and the blue curves are examples of time-varying decision thresholds. The upper and
lower thresholds correspond to the “right” and “left” responses, respectively. In this example, the canoe
position has reached the participant’s “right” decision threshold at t0 = 8.2 secs.
direction and so the canoe goes to the correct end of the screen faster. Figure 3 shows the probability of
responding correctly (accuracy) and the mean reaction time (RT) as a function of the decision threshold
for two values of P0. To generate these figures, we used time-constant decision thresholds with the same
absolute value for the left and right responses. The horizontal axis in these figures is the absolute value
of the decision threshold. For any given value of P0 and the decision threshold, we used the method in
Diederich & Busemeyer (2003) to compute the accuracy and the mean RT2. Two points should be noted in
2Since the canoe movement is governed by a Markov chain, the problem of finding the mean RT and accuracy for a given
8
these figures: First, for all values of P0 when the value of the decision threshold increases, both accuracy and
mean RT increase. Therefore, the participants can balance between their speed and accuracy by adjusting
their decision threshold. Second, for the same value of the decision threshold, the accuracy is higher for
larger values of P0. Therefore, the level of the difficulty is determined by the value of P0.
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Figure 3: Accuracy and mean RT in canoe movement detection task. Top: Accuracy, Bottom:
mean RT as functions of the decision threshold for two values of P0.
Here, we should emphasize on another advantage of using this stimulus for the purposes of the current
paper: For a given value of P0, the accuracy and the mean RT are determined only by the decision thresholds.
In other words, if two participants use exactly the same decision thresholds, their accuracy and mean RT
will be the same. This is not the case in the conventional stimuli used in the perceptual decision making
tasks. For example, consider the random dot motion task. The difficulty of the task is determined by
the “motion coherence”, the percentage of dots that move coherently toward the correct direction. Since
different participants have different perceptual ability in detecting the motion, for a fixed level of difficulty,
even if two participants use the exact same decision thresholds, their accuracy and/or mean RT may not
be the same. More importantly, it is possible that due to perceptual learning the ability of an individual
participant in detecting the correct direction of the motion increases by experience during the experiment
Law & Gold (2009). Therefore, the participants’ performance is a function of both perceptual and decisional
processes. In this paper, we are interested in investigating the decisional processes and so it is appealing to
use a stimulus which makes the performance only a function of the decisional processes.
We used this stimulus in two experiments. The details of these experiments are given in the next two
value of the decision threshold is equivalent to the problem of finding the probability and time of reaching an absorbing state in
a Markov chain. There are numerical methods for solving this problem. We used the matrix method in Diederich & Busemeyer
(2003).
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sections. All studies reported below, were approved by the Indiana university IRB and all participants
provided informed written consent before participating in the study.
2.1.1. Experiment A
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate how the participants adjust their decision threshold,
when they have to allocate limited time between decisions with different properties. We used the canoe
movement detection task introduced above. The experiment consisted of 40 blocks of trials. All blocks for
all participants were 1 minute long. The number of trials in each block depended on the participant’s speed
in responding. Each trial was drawn with probability 0.5 from one of the two possible conditions: easy
or hard. In the easy trials, the probability that the canoe would move toward the correct direction was
P0 = 0.65. This probability was P0 = 0.51 for the hard trials. In the easy trials, the participants would gain
or lose 20 coins for a correct or incorrect response, respectively. This pay-off was ±1 coin in the hard trials.
In addition, after an incorrect response in an easy trial, the participant had to wait 3 more seconds before
the next trial begins. This delay penalty did not exist for the hard trials.
The timeline of one trial is illustrated in Figure 4. At the beginning of each trial, a cue was presented
that would indicate the condition of the upcoming trial: a red smiley face would indicate an easy trial and
a green smiley face would indicate a hard trial. Then a fixation cross-hair was presented for a random time
drawn uniformly from interval [1.25, 1.75] secs. The stimulus was presented then and remained on the screen
until the participant responded. After the participant responded, the feedback was shown for 0.5 secs. After
that, a gray smiley face was shown for 1 sec before the next trial started. In the easy trial, if the response
was incorrect this time was extended to 4 secs.
The participants were informed about this structure of the task. Specifically, they were told that since the
blocks duration is fixed, to experience more trials they should respond faster, but on the other hand being
faster reduces accuracy. Also they were informed that there are two types of trials with different pay-off
structure, and that the cues indicate the condition of the upcoming trial. participants were motivated to
collect as many coins as they could in the 40 blocks by being told that they will receive $1 for each 1000
coins they collected in the study. A total of 29 participants (age:19-27, 14 female) participated in this study.
Three participants were excluded from all analyses because their performance was at the chance level in both
easy and hard conditions.
2.1.2. Experiment B
This experiment is similar to Experiment A with one crucial difference: no cue is presented at the
beginning of the trials. Therefore, the participants could not know what condition a trial is coming from.
The pay-off structure for the two conditions was exactly the same as Experiment A. This experiment consisted
of 35 one-minute blocks. Also, in the easy trials P0 = 0.75.
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fixa!on
s!mulus
feedback
1 sec
Uniform in 
[1.25,1.75] sec
RT
0.5 sec
DP+ITI
Figure 4: Experiment A. The timeline of events in one trial of Experiment A. See the text for more details.
DP: delay penalty, RT: response time, ITI: inter-trial interval.
A total of 22 participants (age:19-30, 12 female) participated in this study. Two participants were
excluded from the analysis because their performance was at the chance level.
2.2. Modeling experiments as semi-Markov decision processes
The main focus of this paper is on developing and comparing computational models of the participants’
threshold adjustment in the above experiments. The RL theory and the accompanying algorithms have been
used extensively to model the learning behavior in rewarded decision making experiments. Similar to these
experiments, in Experiments A and B the participants should learn to make their decisions in each trial such
that the total outcome achieved during the experiment is maximized. In addition, the relationship between
the decisions and the achieved outcomes is probabilistic. The RL models have been shown to be powerful
tools for explaining the behavior in these situations. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conjecture that the
thresholds adjustment in our experiments can be explained well with the RL algorithms.
In experiments in which the total outcome depends only on the rewards achieved in each trial, the first
step in constructing an RL model is to describe the experiment as a Markov decision process (MDP). In our
experiments, however, the total outcome depends not only on the rewards but also on the decision times
in each trial. We, therefore, model the experiments in a framework called semi-Markov decision processes
(SMDP) which is a generalization of the MDPs. To make the paper self-contained we give a brief explanation
of the SMDPs next. In the next two sub-sections, we show how the components of Experiments A and B
can be mapped to the components of an SMDP. In a later section, we show how the problem of learning the
decision thresholds can be modeled in this framework.
An SMDP models the interaction between an agent and the environment. Since we are using this
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framework to model the learning behavior of the participants in the experiments, the agent is the participant
and the environment is the experiment. An SMDP is specified by a 5-tuple < S,A, T,R,D >. The state
space S, is the set of all possible states in the experiment. Intuitively, a state specifies a unique “situation”
in the experiment, and so the state space includes all possible situations in the experiment. The action space
A, is the set of all possible actions in all the states. In the SMDP framework, at each step, the environment
is in one of the possible states. The agent takes one of the possible actions in that state. After taking
the action, the environment remains in the same state for some time and then transitions to a new state,
and the agent receives some rewards (positive or negative). The transition between states, the rewards and
the time between transitions are all stochastic. Assume that at step k, the agent is in state si,k and takes
action ak. The probability of transition from si,k after taking action ak to a new state sj,k+1 is denoted
T ai,j = Pr(sj,k+1|si,k, ak). Similarly, the probability of receiving reward rk is Rai (rk) = Pr(rk|si,k, ak), and
the probability of the transition time being dk is D
a
i (dk) = Pr(dk|si,k, ak).3
The probabilities T ai,j , R
a
i (r) and D
a
i (d), specify the dynamic of the environment. It is usually assumed
that the dynamic of the environment is unknown to the agent. The goal of the agent is to learn the optimal
policy by interacting with the environment. A policy pis,a, is a mapping from a state s to the probability
of taking each possible action a in that state, that is pis,a = Pr(a|s). Therefore, the goal of the agent is to
learn which action to take in each state to achieve the optimal performance. Several measures of optimality
have been considered in the literature for SMDP problems. We will adopt the average reward rate defined
as follows:
ρpi(s) = lim
N→∞
E[
∑N
τ=0 rτ ]
E[
∑N
τ=0 dτ ]
(1)
In this equation, ρpi(s) is the average reward rate in state s given that the participant is following policy
pi in all states. In the next section, we will explain why this is an appropriate measure of optimality of
performance in our experiments.
Das et. al., Das et al. (1999) have investigated the optimality in SMDPs with this measure. It has been
shown that under some technical assumptions (which hold for our experiments), the average reward rate
does not depend on the initial state and will be the same for all states (see Das et al. (1999), the paragraph
after equation 4 for more details). Therefore, we drop the dependency to the state and use ρpi as the average
reward rate in all states of the experiment when following policy pi. The optimal value of the average reward
rate is ρ∗ = maxpi{ρpi}. An agent is behaving optimally if its following a policy pi∗ which is yielding the
maximum average reward rate, that is ρpi∗ = ρ
∗. Theorem 1 in Das et al. (1999) shows that this optimal
3Generally, both the reward and the transition time could depend on the new state. However, as we will see shortly, we do
not need this assumption for modeling the experiments in this paper and so we assume that they depend only on the old state
and the taken action.
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value is unique and it satisfies the following system of equations:
V ∗(si) = max
a
{∑
r
r ·Rai (r)− ρ∗ ·
∫
τ ·Dai (τ)dτ +
∑
sj∈S
T ai,j · V ∗(sj)
}
,∀si ∈ S (2)
where V ∗(si) is the optimal value of state si. The unknown variables in this system of equations are optimal
state values V ∗(si) and the optimal average reward rate ρ∗. The importance of these equations, called the
Bellman optimality equations, is that by solving them we can determine the optimal policy pi∗: given the
values of V ∗(si), the optimal action in state si is a∗ = arg maxa{Q(si, a)}, where Q(si, a) is the term in the
braces in Equation 2. When the dynamic of the environment (T ai,j , R
a
i (r) and D
a
i (d)) is known to the agent,
dynamic programming methods can be used to solve these equations and find the optimal policy Bertsekas
& Tsitsiklis (1996); Sutton & Barto (1998). However, when the dynamic is unknown (which is the case for
our experiments as we will see soon), the agent should learn the optimal policy only by interacting with
its environment. The class of algorithms for learning the optimal policy in stochastic environment with
unknown dynamics are known as RL algorithms.
To model Experiments A and B as SMDPs, we should specify the state and action spaces, and the
corresponding distributions T ai,j , R
a
i (r) and D
a
i (d). In the subsequent sections, we specify these for each of
the experiments.
2.2.1. SMDP model of Experiment A
As it was mentioned above, the states are distinct possible situations in the environment. In a sense, in
Experiment A there are two distinct situations: easy trials and hard trials. Therefore, we can model this
experiment with an SMDP with two states. In each trial, the environment (experiment) is in one of these
two possible states. Since in this experiment, the two types of trials are presented randomly with equal
probability, the transition probabilities are T ai,j = 0.5 for i, j = E,H (for easy and hard) and for all actions
a. In words, the transition probabilities does not depend on the actions.
Given this state space, the specification of the reward and transition time in each state is simple. The
reward is the number of coins that the participant receives in each trial. The transition time is the time be-
tween the beginning of a trial and the next trial. This time includes the cue, fixation and reward presentation
time, the participant’s reaction time, and the delay penalty in the incorrect trials.
Finally, we must specify the set of possible actions. Since in each trial (or state) there are two possible
responses, left and right, one might consider these as the set of possible actions in each state. However,
this is not an appropriate choice for actions for the state space that we are considering. The reason is that
the actions must be defined such that the probabilities Rai (r) and D
a
i (d) are well-defined. Suppose that in
a hard trial the participant has chosen the left response. Given this information, one cannot specify either
the probability of the reward that the participant will receive, or the time it takes to transition to the next
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trial. Therefore, we propose another choice for the actions: the value of the decision thresholds. This is an
appropriate choice for the action space for two reasons. First, based on the assumption of the sequential
sampling models, the value of the decision threshold is set by the participant, and so it is reasonable to
model the value of the decision threshold in each trial, as the action that the agent (the participant) has
taken4. Second, given the state (hard or easy) and the value of the decision threshold, we can determine the
probability that the response will be correct, as well as the distribution of the reaction time which determines
the transition time. In other words, the probabilities Rai (r) and D
a
i (d) are well-defined given the state and
the action.
In sum, after observing the cue at the beginning of each trial, the participant is in one the two states,
easy or hard. She takes the action a which means that she sets the decision thresholds for the right and
left responses at the values ±a5. This action determines the probability distribution of the reward, Rai (r),
and transition time, Dai (d), in that trial. The dynamic of the environment is unknown to the participant
which means that the participant does not know the relationship between the decision threshold a and the
probabilities Rai (r) and D
a
i (d). Instead, in each trial, the participant observes reward r and the inter-trial
time d, which are random samples from these distributions. In the RL model, which we explain later, the
participant uses these random samples to adjust her decision threshold after each trial in order to maximize
the average reward rate. The two-state SMDP of Experiment A is shown in panel (a) of Figure 5.
Finally, we should explain why the average reward rate defined in Equation 1 is an appropriate measure
of the optimality of the performance in our experiments. An “optimal participant” in these experiments,
will try to obtain the maximum possible reward during the whole experiment. Suppose that a participant
sets her decision thresholds in the two conditions such that her overall average reward rate is ρ. Since the
duration of the experiment is fixed, say T units of time, the participant will receive ρ · T units of reward
during the whole experiment. Therefore, to maximize the total amount of reward, the participant should
maximize the average reward rate and so this is an appropriate measure of the optimality in our experiments.
2.2.2. SMDP model of Experiment B
As it was explained before, in this experiment no cue is presented at the beginning of the trials. There
are two possible ways to model this experiment with an SMDP. In the first model, we assume that since no
cue is presented and since the participant sets her decision threshold at the beginning of each trial, all trials
are considered by the participant as a single state of the environment. Therefore, the participant will set the
same value of the decision threshold for both easy and hard conditions. The corresponding one-state SMDP
4It is important to note that, since the threshold can take any positive value, the action space defined in this way is
continuous.
5Here, for simplicity, we are considering time-constant thresholds. In later sections, we will show how this notion of action
can be used with time-varying thresholds as well.
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Figure 5: SMDPs corresponding to the experiments. (a) two-state SMDP model of Experiment A.
The states correspond to the easy and hard trials. Since these trials are intermixed randomly, the transition
probabilities are all equal to 0.5 (shown on the arrows). (b) One-state SMDP model of Experiment B. In
this model, all trials are considered as one state and the participant sets one decision threshold for all trials.
(c) Two-state SMDP model of Experiment B. In this model, in each trial the true state of the environment
is either easy or hard. However, the participant cannot observe this state. Instead, she tries to infer the
true state by observing the canoe movement at the beginning of the trial and then sets the corresponding
decision threshold.
is shown in panel (b) of Figure 5.
In the second model, we assume that the participants use a fast mechanism to first detect the difficulty
of the trial after the presentation of the stimulus, and then set appropriate decision threshold based on the
detected state. In each trial, the environment is in one of two possible states, easy or hard. This true state
is unknown (unobservable) to the participant. However, the participant can make observations which can be
used to infer, probabilistically, the true state. In Experiment B, these observations are the canoe positions
as time elapses in a trial. In the model, it is assumed that in each trial the participant observes the canoe
movement for a while and first infers which condition this trial is coming from, and then responds whenever
the canoe reaches the threshold corresponding the inferred state.
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For state inference, we use this fact that in the hard trials, the difference between the probability that
the canoe moves toward the correct direction and the probability of moving toward the incorrect direction
is smaller than in the easy trials. Therefore, the canoe moves back and forth more and so does not get
away from the center of the screen as quickly as in the easy trials. Thus, if after some time the canoe is
not “far enough” from the center, it is more likely that the trial is hard. Based on these observations, we
propose the following model: the participant observes the canoe movement from the beginning of the trial
up to an internal deadline tD. If the absolute value of the canoe position reaches a value aD at any time
τD, 0 ≤ τD ≤ tD, the participant infers that the current trial is easy and so sets her decision threshold at
values ±aE . Otherwise, she infers a hard trial and sets the decision threshold at ±aH . After setting the
decision threshold, the participant checks if the canoe position has reached that threshold so far. If this is
the case, the participant chooses the right or the left response right away, depending on if the canoe has
reached the positive or the negative threshold first. In this case, the decision time will be equal to τD. If the
canoe position has not reached the decision threshold yet, the participant does not respond and waits until
the canoe reaches the decision threshold at some time t > τD and then make her decision. In this case the
decision time will be t. Therefore, the decision time in each trial is max{t, τD}. The values tD, aD, aE and
aH are free parameters of the model and are estimated from each participant’s data as we will explain later.
The corresponding SMDP is shown in panel (c) of Figure 5.
Depending on the values of these parameters and the profile of the canoe position in a trial, several
scenarios could happen. Figure 6 shows four possible scenarios. In the top-left panel of this figure, aD < aH
and the canoe position did not reach the state detection threshold aD before the internal deadline tD and so
the participant infers that this is a hard trial and sets her decision threshold at ±aH . Then, the participant
waits until the canoe position reaches ±aH . In this example, at time t the canoe reaches −aH and so he
participant response is left and her decision time is t. In the top-right panel, the canoe reaches aD at τD and
so the participant sets her decision threshold at ±aE . In the scenarios shown in the bottom row of Figure
6 the sate detection threshold aD is larger than the decision thresholds. In the bottom-left panel, the canoe
does not reach aD before the deadline tD and so the threshold is set at aH . However, the canoe has reached
aH at time t0 < tD and so the decision time will be equal to tD = max(t0, tD). Similarly, the decision time
in the bottom-left panel of the figure is τD.
In both models, the experiment is modeled by a partially observable SMDP. In each trial, the environment
is in one of two possible states which is unknown to the participant. However, the participant makes noisy
observations which can be used to make probabilistic inference about the true state. The models differ in
the way these observations are used to make inference and set the decision thresholds. In the second model,
as we explained, the participant uses these observation to make a decision about the difficulty of the trial
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first and then sets the corresponding decision threshold. In the first model, the inference mechanism and its
relationship to the shape of the decision threshold is implicit and more complicated. This model has been
investigated extensively in previous research Busemeyer & Rapoport (1988); Rao (2010); Drugowitsch et al.
(2012). Here, we give a brief explanation of how the single time-varying decision threshold arises as the
optimal solution. Suppose that at the beginning of each trial, the participant has some prior belief about
the difficulty level of the upcoming trial. When the trial starts, after each time step, the participant receives
a piece of noisy information. In the optimal model, the participant uses the Bayes rule after each time step
to update her belief about the difficulty of the trial based on the new information. At each time step, the
participant must decide if she wants to accumulate information for at least one more time step or she wants
to stop accumulating information and respond. The participant makes this decision at each time step based
on her current belief about the difficulty of the trial. The participant does not make a decision about the
difficulty of the trial. Instead, her belief on how likely each difficulty level is affects her decision at each
time step. Intuitively, as time elapses in a trial, it becomes more likely that the trial is hard and so the
participant is more willing to stop accumulating information and respond. This results in a time-decreasing
decision threshold. In addition, since the observations the participant makes at each time step are considered
to be independent, the participants belief at each time step depends only on the value of the accumulated
information at that time step and not the history of the observations. Since, the participant’s decision at
each time step (stop or continue accumulating information) depends only on this belief, this assumption
results in a single decision threshold for all trials. In this paper, our focus is not on the mechanism which
lead to this single time-varying threshold. Instead, we aimed at investigating if the participants use a single
threshold as is suggested by the second model, or they use two thresholds as is suggested by the first model.
An interesting question that arises is if the maximum possible average reward rate that can be achieved
by the second model is equal or smaller than the first model. In the section Optimal performance below, we
investigate this question.
2.3. Reinforcement learning models of Experiment A
In this section, we use the SMDP model of experiment A to develop computational models for threshold
adjustment in this experiment. In the next section, we propose other computational models which are not
based on the SMDP framework.
As it was explained before, the goal of the agent in an SMDP problem is to learn the optimal policy
which maximizes the average reward rate. This is equivalent to solving the Bellman optimality equations 2.
However, since the dynamic of the environment (T ai,j , R
a
i (r) and D
a
i (d)) is unknown to the agent, it is not
possible to solve these equations directly. Instead, the agent should learn the (approximate) optimal policy
by interacting with the environment. In the literature of computer science and machine learning, several
algorithms based on the theory of reinforcement learning have been proposed to tackle this problem. In
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Figure 6: Four possible scenarios in detecting the difficulty in Experiment B. Depending on the val-
ues of the thresholds and the canoe path, several cases could happen. In each panel the detected state, the par-
ticipant’s response and the reaction time are as follows: Top-left: state = H, response = left, RT = t,Top-
right: state = E, response = right,RT = t,Bottom-left: state = H, response = right,RT = tD,Bottom-
right: state = E, response = right,RT = τD. See the text for more details on how to determine these.
one class of these algorithms, the agent uses its experience with the environment to build a model of the
environment and uses this model to find the optimal policy. For this reason, these algorithms are known as
model-based RL algorithms. The main idea is that after each decision (taking an action), the reward, the
transition time and the new state given the old state and the taken action, are considered as samples from the
corresponding random variables. These samples are used to estimate the probability distributions T ai,j , R
a
i (r)
and Dai (d). Therefore, the agent builds an estimate of the dynamic of the environment and updates it after
each step. Then, in each state the agent uses this estimate model of the environment and solves Bellman
optimality equations using a dynamic programming algorithm. Since the agent has to re-solve the Bellman
equations in each step, these algorithms are computationally demanding. On the other hand, since the agent
updates its estimate of the dynamic of the environment after each step, model-based RL algorithms are able
to find a new optimal policy rather quickly if the environment changes in the middle of the task (for example
if the value of the rewards or the transition probabilities changed during the task).
Another class of models, called model-free RL, learn the optimal policy by learning the state values
directly and without estimating the dynamic of the environment. Comparison between the model-based and
model-free algorithms is outside the scope of this paper. Since the action space is continuous in our SMDP
18
models, formulation of the model-based algorithms is harder than the model-free algorithms and so, for the
sake of simplicity, we only consider model-free version of our algorithms (see for example Daw et al. (2011);
Simon & Daw (2011); Dezfouli & Balleine (2013) for more details on comparing model-free and model-based
algorithms).
To model the adjustment of the decision thresholds in the SMDP framework, we use an Actor-Critic
model with average reward temporal difference learning (Figure 7). In an Actor-Critic architecture, an
Actor represents the current policy and is responsible for taking actions in each state, while the Critic
module represents the estimated state values and evaluates “how good” are the actions taken by the Actor
based on these estimated values. We first explain the implementation of the Actor module and then the
Critic module for our experiments.
In constructing the Actor, we need to consider two problems: how to represent the policy, and how to
update the policy. We first explain how the policy is represented in our model and then we turn to the
problem of updating policy.
In most previous psychological experiments for which an RL model has been proposed, in each state there
are a few possible actions available to the participant (for example a choice between four doors in Simon &
Daw (2011) or a choice between two boxes in Daw et al. (2011)). In these situations, the participant’s policy
can be specified by a probability mass function pi(s, a) = Pr(a|s), ∀a ∈ As, where As is the set of all possible
actions in state s. In each state s, the Actor selects an action a with probability pi(s, a). After each step,
the agent updates the value of these probabilities by some learning rule. In our experiments, the available
actions in each state are all possible values for the decision threshold in that state, and therefore, the action
space is continuous. Therefore, it is not possible to update the policy as in the discrete action case. One
possible way to address this problem is to represent the policy as a parametric distribution over the actions
and update the parameters of that distribution Williams (1992). We first explain the method for the case
where the threshold is constant during a trial and then extend it to the more complicated case where the
threshold is allowed to dynamically change within a trial (i.e. time-varying threshold).
The simplest choice is to represent the policy by a Gaussian distribution:
pik(s, a) =
1√
2piσ2k,s
exp
(
(a−mk,s)2
2σ2k,s
)
(3)
This means that if trial k is from condition s (easy or hard), the participant’s threshold will be a
Gaussian random variable with mean mk,s and variance σ
2
k,s. The actual value of the decision threshold,
that we observe, in that trial will be a sample from this distribution. The participant updates the mean
and variance of this distribution after each trial by some learning rule. Even if there is no learning, that
is if mk,s and σ
2
k,s remain constant during the experiment, representing the policy by a random variable
means that there is between-trial variability in the decision threshold. Before explaining the learning rule
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for the policy parameters, it is important to justify the choice of probabilistic decision thresholds in our
models. In most instantiations of the sequential sampling models, the decision threshold is assumed to
be a deterministic parameter with no between-trial variability. These models, however, assume that some
other parameters are random variables (for example initial value of the accumulated information and the
drift rate in the drift diffusion mode (DDM)). The main reason for this modeling assumption is that these
models are used for experiments in which the decision threshold is not observed directly (e.g., the random
dot motion task) and the effect of variability in the decision threshold can be mimicked by variability in
other parameters (specifically with variability in the initial value of the accumulated information in DDM).
Therefore, these models arbitrarily assume that the decision threshold is deterministic and some other
parameters are random6. In our experiments, in contrast, we can directly observe the decision threshold
and, as we will see, there is a lot of between-trial variability in the decision threshold of each participant. In
addition, in this experiment, the initial position of the canoe is zero in all trials and so there is no variability
in the initial value of the accumulated information. Finally, the rate of the information accumulation is
controlled by the probability of moving in the correct direction in each time step, and so it remains constant
between trials. For these reasons, representing the decision threshold as a random variable is reasonable in
our models.
Now we turn to the problem of updating the policy parameters after each trial. Developing algorithms
for learning the optimal policy for continuous action-space problems is challenging, specifically when the
dimensionality of the state-space increases. In the SMDPs of our experiments, however, there are at most 2
states. Also, our goal is not to develop an algorithm that can efficiently learn the optimal policy. Instead,
we are interested in simple algorithms that can model human participants’ learning mechanisms in our
experiments. Here, we develop a simple instantiation of a class of algorithms called REINFORCE Williams
(1992). Consider a stochastic policy pi(s, a|θs), in which the possible actions in state s are parameterized by
the set of parameters θs = [θ1,s, ..., θp,s]
T . In a REINFORCE learning algorithm, the amount of change in
each parameter after transition from state s in trial k, to a new state s′ is:
∆θi,s,k = αs,k · (rs −Bi,s) · ∂ ln[pi(s, a|θs,k)]
∂θi,s,k
(4)
where αs,k is the learning rate, rs is some measure of the future reward achievable from state s by following
the current policy, and Bi,s is a baseline reinforcement. Williams Williams (1992) proved that in any
REINFORCE algorithm: E[∆θs|θs] = αs · ∇θsE[rs|θs]. In words, moving in the direction of ∆θs, on
6One notable exception in this regard is the Grice modeling framework in which the decision process is modeled as a race
between several accumulators Grice (1968). In this framework, the information accumulation in each accumulator is modeled as
a deterministic function while the thresholds are modeled as random variables (see Jones & Dzhafarov (2014) for the relationship
between this framework and some other sequential sampling models).
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average, is equivalent to moving in the direction of the gradient of the average future reward with respect
to the parameters.
The learning rule 4 defines a general class of algorithms. To specify a learning algorithm in this class
completely, one needs to define the measure of the future reward rs, and the baseline reinforcement Bi,s. In
the SMDP framework, the future expected reward is specified by the state values, V (s) = E[rs,s′−ρ·τ+V (s′)],
where rs,s′ is the one-step reward that is achieved by going from s to s
′. The expectation is taken over the
policy and all possible future states s′ and dwell times τ . Computing this expectation needs the knowledge of
the quantities T ai,j , R
a
i (r) and D
a
i (d) (see Equation 2). Instead, we use the one-step sample of this expectation.
Suppose that at trial k the agent is in state s, takes action ak, and transitions to a new state s
′ after dk
units of time. Also, suppose that the agent’s current estimate of the value of states s and s′, and the average
reward rate are Vˆk(s), Vˆk(s
′) and ρˆk, respectively. Then, the estimate of the expected future reward in state
s is defined as rs,s′ − ρˆ · dk + Vˆk(s′). If in addition, we defined Bi,s = Vˆk(s), the term in the parentheses in
Equation 4 becomes:
δs(k) = rs,s′ − ρˆk · dk + Vˆk(s′)− Vˆk(s) (5)
δs(k) is called the temporal difference (TD) error and plays an important role in many reinforcement
learning algorithms. By computing the derivative of the natural logarithm of the right-hand sight of Equation
3 with respect to mk,s and replacing it in Equation 4, the final form of the learning rule for mk,s will be:
mk+1,s = mk,s + αs,m · δs(k) · (ak −mk,s) (6)
where ak is the observed decision threshold in trial k. In this equation, as it was suggested by Williams
(1992), we have set αs,k = αs,m · σ2s,k. It is easy to derive a similar learning rule for σ2s,k. However, to
simplify the model, we assume that this parameter increases or decreases linearly during the experiment:
σ2k,s = σ
2
0,s + αs,σ · k (7)
Here, σ20,s and αs,σ ∈ [−1, 1] are free parameters of the model. The value of σ2s,k determines the balance
between exploration and exploitation in the model: larger values of this parameter means that the participant
chooses values different from the mean more often and therefore explores the policy space more. On the
other hand, smaller values of this parameter means that the participant uses values closer to the mean and
therefore exploits what she has learned instead of exploration. We expect that the participants explore less
with experience and so the value of σ2s,k decreases. However, some participants may decide to explore more
with more experience and therefore we allow the parameter αs,σ to take both positive and negative values.
In the Actor-Critic architecture, the TD error signal is computed by the Critic. This module keeps the
current estimates of the state values and updates them using the following TD learning rule:
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Vˆk+1(s) = Vˆk(s) + αs,c · δs(k) (8)
The architecture of the model is depicted in Figure 7. This figure shows the interaction between the
agent, modeled as the Actor-Critic architecture, and the environment. After the presentation of the cue at
the beginning of a trial the state s is determined and both the Actor and the Critic are informed about it.
The Actor then choses a value for the action based on its current policy. Specifically, it draws a sample from
the Gaussian distribution 3, given the current values of the parameters ms,k and σ
2
s,k. This value, ak, is set
as the decision threshold for the current trial. The participant responses as soon as the position of the canoe
exceeds this value on either side of the screen. Based on the chosen response and the state, the participant
receives some reward rk. The amount of this reward and the total time of the trial, dk, are sent to the Critic.
After the presentation of the cue in the next trial, the Critic uses its current estimate of the values of the
previous and current states, the reward and trial time in the previous state, and its current estimate of the
average reward rate, to compute the TD error. This signal, then, is used to update both the state values,
using Equation 8, and the policy parameters, using Equations 6 and 7.
So far, we have assumed that the decision thresholds remain constant within a trial. Next, we extend
this model to the case where the decision thresholds can change dynamically within a trial. We can still
represent the policy with the Gaussian distribution 3, but now ms,k is a function of the elapsed time in the
trial, and so we denote it by ms,k(t). We need to represent ms,k(t) with a parametric function which is
flexible enough to generate different patterns that the decision threshold may take, and has few parameters
so the number of the free parameters of the model stays small. Following Hawkins et al. (2015) we use the
following functional form for the thresholds which is the Weibull cumulative distribution function:
ms,k(t) = ψs,k −
[
1− exp
(
−
(
t
λs
)φs)]
·
[
1
2
ψs,k − ψ′s
]
(9)
The free parameters are: ψs,k, λs, φs and ψ
′
s. To keep the number of free parameters low, we assume
that the participant only learns ψs,k, and other parameters of this function remain constant during the
experiment. To specify the learning rule for ψs,k, we first need to compute
∂ ln[pi(s,a|θs,k)]
∂ψs,k
. We have:
∂ ln[pi(s, a|θs,k)]
∂ψs,k
=
∂ ln[pi(s, a|θs,k)]
∂ms,k
· ∂ms,k
∂ψs,k
=
(ak −ms,k)
σ2s,k
·
[
0.5 + 0.5 exp
(
−
(
tk
λs
)φs)]
(10)
where tk is the time to complete trial k. Therefore, we use the following learning rule:
ψs,k+1 = ψs,k + αs,φ · δs(k) · (ak −ms,k) ·
[
1 + exp
(
−
(
tk
λs
)φs)]
(11)
We also use learning rule 7 for σ2s,k.
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Figure 7: Actor-Critic model. In each trial, the Actor sets the decision thresholds given its current values
of the parameters. After responding and receiving the feedback in the trial, the Critic computes the TD
error signal. This error is then used to update both the Critic’s current estimate of the state values, and the
current values of the parameters representing the policy in the Actor.
In Figure 8, the function in Equation 9 is plotted for different values of its parameters. Two points should
be noted in this figure: First, for different values of the parameters, this function can take different forms.
Second, by changing ψ the shape of the function may change dramatically. For example, in the middle panel
of this figure, for ψ = 200 the function is decreasing, for ψ = 100 it is constant, and for ψ = 20 it is increasing
(other parameters are kept constant).
Finally, we assume that the subjective value of reward is proportional to the number of coins obtained in
each trial. Specifically, we let rk = βs,r ·xk, where rk is the subjective reward, xk is the number of coins, and
βs,r is the coefficient for condition s = E or H. The effect of this transformation, however, can be captured by
ρˆ, αs,c and αs,φ and so we do not consider βs,r as free parameters. The model with time-constant thresholds
has 13 free parameters, (σ2s,0,ms,0, αs,σ, αs,m, αs,c, Vˆs,0, ρˆ),while the model with time-varying thresholds has
19 free parameters, (σ2s,0, ψs,0, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αs,c, αs,φ, Vˆs,0, ρˆ)
7.
7In the RL models of both experiments A and B we assume that ρˆ is a fixed value and estimate it as a free parameter for
each participant. This is not a plausible assumption. The value of the reward rate should be estimated after each trial using
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Figure 8: Time-varying decision thresholds. The shape of Weibull function for different values of the
parameters. In each panel ψ′, λ and φ are kept constant and the function is plotted for 3 values of ψ. As it
can be seen, changing ψ may change the shape of the function.
2.4. Other computational models of Experiment A
The models developed in the previous section can, potentially, learn the optimal policy that leads to
the maximum possible average reward rate. Although computationally appealing, they may not be able to
explain human participants’ learning behavior in our experiments. Also, not all participants use the same
learning strategy. Some participants may set their decision threshold at the beginning of the experiment
and use the same threshold for the rest of the experiment. Also, in the RL models of the previous section,
it is assumed that the participants consider a cost for time. This is in contrast to the models which have
been proposed to explain the post-error slowing effect in perceptual decision making tasks. Based on these
models, the participants increase (decrease) their decision threshold after an incorrect (correct) response
Laming (1979); Smith & Brewer (1995) and only based on the values of the rewards. Finally, the participants
may set two different desired levels of accuracy and reaction time for the easy and hard conditions, based
on the instructions at the beginning of the experiment, and adjust their decision threshold to achieve those
desired levels. In this section, we will develop models for Experiment A based on these assumptions.
In all these models, the decision threshold is modeled as a Gaussian random variable with the p.d.f. of
Equation 3. In the baseline models below, the mean ms,k and variance σ
2
s,k remain constant during the
the values of the rewards and trial times. We fitted a version of the RL models in which ρˆ was estimated using a simple moving
average algorithm. However, this model resulted in larger BIC compared to the simpler RL models. Therefore, we do not
report the results of these models here. One reason that models with constant ρˆ resulted in lower BIC could be that in the
experiments the value of the reward rate remains constant and therefore the additional complexity in the model for estimating
ρˆ is not necessary.
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experiment. For the other models, σ2s,k is updated using Equation 7. Therefore, the only difference between
these models and the RL models in the previous section is in the way ms,k is updated.
2.4.1. Baseline models
The simplest possible model for the experiment is to assume that no learning occurs during the experi-
ment. We consider two versions of this model. In the first version, which we call Model 0 for future reference,
the participant sets two different time-constant decision threshold for the two conditions. This model has 4
free parameters, (mE , σ
2
E ,mH , σ
2
H), which are the mean and variance of the decision thresholds for the easy
and hard conditions.
In the second version, Model 1, the participants sets two time-varying decision thresholds for the two con-
ditions. The decision thresholds have the functional form of Equation 9. This model has 10 free parameters:
(σ2s , ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs), for s = E,H.
2.4.2. Adjusting thresholds proportional to reward
We will consider three versions of this model. In all these versions, the threshold is adjusted as a
function of the subjective value of the reward received in a trial. Specifically, these models assume that if
the participant receives a positive reward in a trial, she will reduce her decision threshold for the next trial,
while she will increase her decision threshold after receiving a negative reward. Let xk be the number of
coins that the participant receives or loses in trial k. This will cause a subjective value of reward rk where:
rk =
[1− exp(−βp · xk)]/βp, xk ≥ 0[1− exp(−βn · xk)]/βn, xk < 0 (12)
The parameters βp and βn control the shape of the subjective reward function (also called the utility
function) for the positive and negative rewards, respectively.
In the first version of the model, Model 2, the participant uses two different time-constant decision
thresholds for the easy and hard trials and adjusts them independently. At the beginning of the experiment,
the mean of these decision thresholds are m0s, s = E or H. After each subsequent trial k of condition s, the
mean of the corresponding threshold is updated as follows:
mk+1s = m
k
s + αs · rk (13)
where αs > 0 is the learning rate in condition s, and rk was defined in Equation 12. This model has 10 free
parameters, (ms,0, σ
2
s,0, αs,σ, αs, βp, βn) for s = E,H.
In the second version of the model, Model 3, the participant uses time-varying thresholds. In contrast
to the RL models, we do not assume that the participant learns the parameters of these functions. Instead,
the whole function is increased or decreased after each trial:
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mk+1s (t) = m
k
s(t) + αs · rk (14)
This model has 16 free parameters: (σ2s,0, αs,σ, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs, βp, βn)
In models 2 and 3, the decision thresholds in the two conditions are adjusted independently. That is, if
for example trial k is an easy trial, the threshold for the hard condition will not be updated after this trial. In
the third version of this class of models, Model 4, we assume that the reward received in one condition affects
the threshold in the other condition. Specifically, if trial k is from condition s, the thresholds corresponding
to this condition and condition s′ 6= s are updated as follows:
ms,k+1(t) = ms,k(t) + αs · rk
ms′,k+1(t) = ms′,k(t) + γs′ · rk
(15)
When γs = 0 this model reduces to Model 3. It is worth noting that in the RL models, since the TD error
δs(t) is a function of both V (s) and V (s
′), the rewards in one condition affect the adjustment of the threshold
in the other condition.
2.4.3. Adjusting thresholds to achieve desired level of accuracy
The participant’s objective in this model is different from the previous models. In this model, it is assumed
that the participant has a desired level of accuracy for each condition. After each trial, the participant lowers
her decision threshold if her current estimate of accuracy is higher than the desired level and increases her
threshold otherwise. Mathematically, after trial k the thresholds are updated as follows:
ms,k+1(t) = ms,k(t) + αs · (θs − pˆs,k) (16)
In this equation, αs is the learning rate, θs is the desired level of accuracy, and pˆs,k is the participant’s
estimate at trial k of her accuracy in condition s.
We assume that the participant has a prior belief about her accuracy in each condition, and updates this
belief after each trial using the Bayes rule. The prior belief is modeled as a Beta distribution, Beta(as, bs).
Assume that up to trial k, the participant has experienced condition s, ns times of which ns,c times her
responses have been correct (and ns − ns,c incorrect). Then, the posterior belief after trial k will be a Beta
distribution, Beta(as + ns,c, bs + ns − ns,c). We assume that the participant uses the mean of this posterior
as her estimate of the accuracy and so:
pˆs,k =
as + ns,c
as + bs + ns
(17)
The version of the model with time-constant thresholds, Model 5, has 14 free parameters, (ms,0, σ
2
s,0, αs,σ, αs, as, bs, θs),
and the version with time-varying thresholds, Model 6, has 20 free parameters, (σ2s,0, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αs, as, bs, θs).
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2.4.4. Adjusting thresholds to achieve desired level of accuracy and mean RT
This model can be considered as a generalization of Model 6. The participant’s objective in this model is
to achieve a desired level of both accuracy and mean RT. Let θs and Ts denote the desired levels of accuracy
and mean RT for condition s, respectively. After each trial k, the participant has an estimate of the current
accuracy and mean RT in each condition. To keep the number of the free parameters of the model low, we
assume that the estimate of the accuracy is obtained by taking the average of the number of correct trials
in the last wa trials, and the estimate of the mean RT is obtained by taking the average of the RT in the
last wt trials, where wa and wt are free parameters. Let pˆs,k and tˆs,k be the estimates of the accuracy and
mean RT for condition s after trial k. These estimates are obtained as follows:
pˆs,k =
nc,s
wa
(18)
tˆs,k =
∑k
i=k−wt+1 di
wa
(19)
where nc,s is the number of correct responses in the last wa trials, and di is the total time spent on trial i.
Now the question is how the participants must adjust their decision thresholds to achieve the desired levels
of accuracy and mean RT. We assume that the participants know that by increasing the decision threshold
both their accuracy and mean RT increases and vice versa (this information is given to the participants
explicitly in the instructions). Now suppose that both the current estimates of the accuracy and the mean
RT are lower than their corresponding desired level. In this case, to become closer to the desired levels,
the participant must increase her decision threshold. But what if, for example, the current estimate of the
accuracy is lower than the desired level while the current estimate of the mean RT is higher than the desired
level?
Here, we consider a simple rule for updating the mean of the decision threshold:
ms,k+1(t) = ms,k(t) + ∆ms,k (20)
where:
∆ms,k = αa · (pˆs,k − θs) + αt · (tˆs,k − Ts) (21)
In words, the change in the threshold is the weighted sum of the discrepancies between the current
estimates and the desired levels of the accuracy and mean RT. The weights αa and αt can be considered
as “attentional weights”: the relative amount of attention that the participant pays to the discrepancy in
the “dimensions” accuracy and RT. The notion of “attentional weights” is used widely in the computational
models of categorization Nosofsky (1986).
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Not all free parameters in equation 21 are identifiable. Therefore, we use the following equation for model
fitting which is obtained by simple algebraic manipulation of equation 21:
∆ms,k = αa · pˆs,k + αt · tˆs,k + cs (22)
We only consider a version of this model with time-varying thresholds. This model, which we call Model
7, has 18 free parameters, (σ2s,0, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αt, αa, cs, wt, wa) .
It is important to note that this model does not provide a normative account of the decision making
process. For example, if a participant has a very high level of desired accuracy and pays too much attention
to this dimension (large value of αa) she will eventually set her decision thresholds at values higher than the
optimal values. Model 7 is meant to provide a reasonable “descriptive” account of the learning process. This
provides an important alternative to the RL models which are based on the optimization of performance.
It is not hard to see that if wa = wt = 1 and if there was only one state in the experiment, then Model
7 and the RL model described above will be equivalent. Therefore, to be able to compare these models it
is important to have two types of trials and the cue at the beginning of the trials which creates an SMDP
with two states as we saw before. Computational models for Experiment A are summarized in Table 1. In
this table, the RL models with time-constant and time-varying thresholds are called Model 8 (or RLC) and
9 (or RLV ), respectively.
2.5. Computational models of Experiment B
The goal here is to assess two hypotheses regarding the decisional mechanism of the participants. Based
on the first hypothesis, H1, since no cue is presented at the beginning of the trials, the participants use
the same value of the decision threshold for both easy and hard trials. As it was explained before, the
corresponding SMDP model in this case will have only one state. This hypothesis is particularly interesting
due to the fact that the optimal behavior in this experiment is to use one set of time-decreasing decision
threshold for both types of trials Drugowitsch et al. (2012); Rao (2010). We will show this in Section Optimal
performance below.
Based on the second hypothesis, H2, the participants use a difficulty-detection mechanism at the beginning
of the trial to identify the difficulty of the current trial and then set their decision threshold accordingly.
To compare these hypotheses, we consider three models based on the first hypothesis and one model
based on the second hypothesis. In the first model based on H1, M
1
H1
,the participants use a time-varying
decision threshold, which is implemented by the functional form 9, for both conditions. In addition, we do
not consider any learning in this model. This model has 5 free parameters: (σ2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ).
In the second model for H1, M
2
H1
, the threshold is modeled the same way. The only difference here is
that in this model we use a one-state version of the RL model to adjust the mean of the thresholds, ms,k(t).
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Table 1: Computational models of Experiment A
Model Threshold1 Parameters No. of free
parameters
0 C σ2s ,ms 4
1 V σ2s , ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs 10
2 C σ2s,0,ms,0, αs,σ, αs, βp, βn 10
3 V σ2s,0, αs,σ, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs, βp, βn 16
4 V σ2s,0, αs,σ, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs, βp, βn, γs 18
5 C σ2s,0,ms,0, αs,σ, αs, as, bs, θs 14
6 V σ2s,0, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αs, as, bs, θs 20
7 V σ2s,0, ψs, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αt, αa, cs, wt, wa 18
8 (RLC) C σ
2
s,0,ms,0, αs,σ, αs,m, αs,c, Vˆs,0, ρˆ 13
9 (RLV) V σ
2
s,0, ψs,0, ψ
′
s, λs, φs, αs,σ, αs,c, αs,φ, Vˆs,0, ρˆ 19
1 C:time-constant, V:time-varying
When there is only one state, s = s′ in Equation 5 and so the TD error will be δk = rk− ρˆ · dk, and does not
depend on the state value anymore. We use this TD error together with Equation 6 to update the mean of
the Gaussian distributions after each trial. We also assume that the subjective value of positive and negative
rewards are βp and βn, respectively. This model has 9 free parameters: (σ
2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ, ασ, βp, βn, ρˆ).
In the third model based on H1, M
3
H1
, as in the previous two models, the participants use the same
threshold for both types of trials. However, in contrast to M2H1 , here the experiment is modeled as a two-
state SMDP (this SMDP is not shown in Figure 5). The main assumption is that the participants sets their
decision threshold at the beginning of each trial and so they have to use the same decision threshold for
both types of trials. However, the adjustment of this single threshold is carried out after the trial is finished
and so the participant knows what was the trial condition. In other words, the experiment is modeled as a
two-state SMDP but the available action is the same in both states. This means that, in contrast to M2H1 ,
Vˆk(s
′) and Vˆk(s) are not canceled out and the TD error will be computed using Equation 5. This model has
12 free parameters: σ2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ, αs,m, αs,m, Vˆs,0, ρˆ.
In the model based on H2, MH2 , the participant first observed the canoe movement up to an internal
deadline tD. If before this deadline the canoe position exceeds a difficulty detection threshold aD, the
participant decides that the current trial is easy and sets her decision thresholds at ±aE . Otherwise the trial
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is detected as being hard and the participant uses the thresholds ±aH . As before, the decision thresholds are
modeled as Gaussian random variables8. We only consider a version of this model in which the thresholds
aE and aH are time-constant. Specifically, if trial k is detected to be from the condition s, the value of
the decision threshold is a sample from a Gaussian variable with mean ms,k and variance σ
2
s . The value
of the means are updated after each trial using Equations 6 and 8. This model has 13 free parameters:
(σ2s ,ms,0, αs,c, αs,m, Vˆs,0, ρˆ, tD, aD). Computational models of Experiment B are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Computational models of Experiment B
Model Parameters No. of free
parameters
M1H1 σ
2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ 5
M2H1 σ
2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ, ασ, βp, βn, ρˆ 9
M3H1 σ
2, ψ, ψ′, λ, φ, αs,m, αs,m, Vˆs,0, ρˆ 12
MH2 σ
2
s ,ms,0, αs,c, αs,m, Vˆs,0, ρˆ, tD, aD 13
2.6. Model fitting
We fitted each model to the trial by trial values of the decision threshold for each participant separately.
In all models, the threshold for condition s at trial k is modeled as a Gaussian random variable with mean
ms,k(t) and variance σ
2
s,k. For a given set of values of the parameters for each model, we can compute these
quantities for all k and s. The likelihood of observing the value ak for the decision threshold for a participant
at trial k given that the trial was from condition s is:
lk = Pr[ak|s, k,ms,k(t), σ2s,k, tk] =
1√
2piσ2s,k
exp
(
− [ak −ms,k(tk)]
2
2σ2s,k
)
(23)
Notice that we have used ms,k(tk), the value of the decision threshold at time tk, where tk is the partici-
pant’s reaction time in trial k. Also, although not explicitly mentioned in this equation, we use ms,k(tk) > 0
if the participant’s response was correct and ms,k(tk) < 0 if the response was incorrect in rial k. Therefore,
the observed data for each participant has the form (yk, tk, ak), k = 1, 2, ..., N , where yk is the participant’s
response (left or right). For each participant and each model we found the values of the parameters of
the model such that the likelihood of the observed data was maximized. To find these values we used the
differential evolution method for optimization (DEopim package in R, Mullen et al. (2011)).
8To reduce the number of free parameters, we assume that aD is a deterministic variable.
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3. Results
3.1. Optimal performance
In this section, we compute the optimal decision thresholds which result in the maximum possible average
reward rate for the two experiments. Previous studies have used dynamic programming to obtain the
optimal decision thresholds Busemeyer & Rapoport (1988); Frazier & Yu (2008); Rao (2010); Drugowitsch
et al. (2012). To do this, both time and the range of possible values for the accumulated information
are discretized. Then it is assume that at each time-step and value of the accumulated information, the
participant has to make one of two possible actions: continue accumulating information or stop and make
a decision. There is a cost for each time step that the decision is not made. This results in a discrete time
and state MDP for which the optimal policy can be found using dynamic programming.
Here, we take another approach for computing the optimal thresholds. Since in all computational models
that we consider, the time-varying boundaries are modeled as a Weibull function, for each experiment we
find the values of the parameters of a Weibull function that maximizes the reward rate. Specifically, for each
set of values of the parameters of the Weibull function, we simulated the canoe movement path 10000 times
and computed the reward and reaction time for each simulated path. Then the reward rate was computed
as the average value of the reward divided by the average value of the reaction time in these simulations.
We found the optimal values of the parameters using differential evolution method for global optimization
(DEopim package in R, Mullen et al. (2011)).
The optimal thresholds for Experiments A and B are shown in Figure 9. The optimal threshold for the
hard trials in Experiment A is zero. For the easy trials, the optimal threshold remains constant (at about
155 pixels) up to about 13 secs and collapses rapidly afterwards. This collapse is because there is a 15
secs deadline in each trial and if the participant does not respond before this time the trial is considered
as incorrect. Therefore, the thresholds collapse to insure that a respond will be given in each trial. The
constant optimal threshold is interesting. If there is only one type of trials, based on Wald’s famous theorem
on sequential probability ratio test, the optimal threshold is constant Wald & Wolfowitz (1948); Bogacz et al.
(2006). Our results suggest that even if there are more than one type of trials, intermixed randomly, and if
it is possible to use a different threshold for each type of trials (by presenting a cue in Experiment A), then
the optimal threshold for each condition is also constant9.
In section Materials and Methods, we proposed two models for Experiment B. In the first model the
participant adopts one time-varying threshold for both easy and hard trials, while in the second model the
participant tries to detect the difficulty of the trial and then sets the decision thresholds accordingly. The
9We computed the optimal thresholds for many different values of the experiment’s parameters (values of the rewards,
difficulty levels, delay penalties and so on) and for all of them the optimal thresholds were time-constant.
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right panel of Figure 9 shows the single optimal threshold for the first model. As it can be seen, the optimal
threshold is time-decreasing. Intuitively, using this form of the decision threshold looks reasonable: if the
accumulated information has not reached the decision threshold after some time, the trial is more likely to
be a hard trial and so it is not worth it to spend much more time on it, and therefore it is reasonable to
decrease the decision threshold. With this threshold the average reward rate is 0.905.
In the second model, the participant accumulates information up to a time tD. If the canoe position
reaches a threshold aD before this deadline, the participant detects that the trial is easy and sets her decision
threshold at ±aE . Otherwise, she will use ±aH as the thresholds in that trial. We computed the values of
the parameters tD, aD, aE and aH for which the reward rate is maximized in Experiment B. The optimal
values of the parameters are: tD = 1.5, aD = 135, aE = 135, aH = 90. For these values the average reward
rate is 0.88. Therefore, the maximum average reward rate obtained by the first model is larger than the
second model. In other words, detecting the difficulty and then setting the decision thresholds does not have
any advantage over using the same decision threshold for both easy and hard trials. However, as we will see,
most of the participants used the second strategy.
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Figure 9: Optimal decision thresholds. Left: The optimal decision thresholds for the easy and hard
conditions in Experiment A. The threshold for the hard condition is 0. Right: the single optimal threshold
for both easy and hard trials in Experiment B.
3.2. Behavioral results of experiment A
This experiment consisted of 40 blocks of trials. We recorded participants’ choice, reaction time and the
canoe position at the time the participant responded (the decision threshold) in each trial. These quantities
as functions of the block number, averaged across all 26 participants, are shown in Figure 10. As it can
be seen in the left panel of this figure, on average the participants learn to decrease their threshold for
responding in the hard trials. Also, it seems that the threshold in the easy trials increases slightly. Mixed-
effect regression analysis with block number and condition as regressors and considering block number as
the random effect, showed that the change in the decision threshold (as a function of the block number) in
the easy condition is not significant (p = 0.3508) while it is significant in the hard condition (p < 0.0001).
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Also, the difference between the two conditions is significant (p < 0.0001).
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Figure 10: Results of Experiment A. Left: mean position of the canoe at the time the participant made
her decision. Middle: mean RT. Right: accuracy. E: easy trials. H: hard trials. Each curve is created by
computing the average of the corresponding quantity over 26 participants. The bars indicate standard error.
In the previous section, we showed that the optimal value of the decision threshold is 155 and 0 pixels
for the easy and hard trials, respectively. As it can be seen in Figure 10, for the hard trials the participants’
thresholds were much higher than the optimal value at the beginning of the experiment and decreased by
learning. For the easy trials, for 5 of the participants the average of the decision threshold in the first
block was higher than 155 pixels, and for 21 participants this value was lower than 155 pixels. Figure
11 shows the average value of the decision threshold in the easy trials in each block for these two groups
of participants. The best fitted linear model to this data is also shown in this figure. The slope of the
line is -1.12 (t(38) = 3.31, p = 0.002) for the group with higher than optimal initial threshold, and 0.12
(t(38) = 3.06, p = 0.004) for the group with lower than the optimal initial threshold. Therefore, the direction
of the change in the decision threshold is toward the optimal value for both groups of the participants.
Our main focus in this paper is on how the participants adjust their decision threshold after each trial.
Specifically, how the decision threshold is adjusted as a function of the rewards and the time of a trial.
Figure 12 shows the changes from trial to trial in the decision threshold as a function of the achieved reward
and the total trial time (including the delay penalty, ITI and so on). Let ak denote the value of the decision
threshold at trial k. Each point in this figure represents ak+1 − ak. Here, k is not the actual trial index.
Instead, it indexes the trials from the same condition. For example if a participant experienced an easy
trial for the first time at trial 10 and for the second time at trial 15, then a2 − a1 for the easy trials will be
the difference between the threshold values in these two trials. Any conclusion from this figure should be
drawn with cautious because any observed effect could be the results of several factors. We will attempt to
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Figure 11: Decision threshold saparated by initial value. The decision threshold for the easy trials
in Experiment A as a function of the block number is shown separated by the average value of the decision
threshold in the first block. High: for these participants the average decision threshold in the first block was
higher than 155 pixels. Low: for these participants this value was lower than 155 pixels. The lines show the
best fitted linear model to the data.
disentangle these effects using computational modeling in the next section. However, it is worth mentioning
at least one effect observed in this figure. For both hard and easy trials, the change in the decision threshold
after receiving a negative reward is higher than the positive reward. In other words, the participants increase
their decision thresholds after committing an error. This is consistent with the well-known post-error slowing
effect Laming (1979); Smith & Brewer (1995).
Figures 1 and 2 in S1 Text show the decision threshold for each participant during the experiment. As
it can be seen in these figures, there is a lot of individual differences. One question that arises is how
many participants have eventually learned the optimal decision thresholds. To answer this question, for each
participant we tested if the decision thresholds in the last five blocks were significantly different from the
optimal values. For the hard trials, we used a binomial test on the number of trials in which the decision
threshold was less than 45 pixels10. With the significant level of 0.05, this test was significant for 14 out of
26 participants. Therefore, 12 participants did not learn to reduce their decision threshold to 0 in the hard
trials by the end of the experiment. For the easy trials, we performed a t-test with the null hypothesis that
the decision threshold is not different from 155. The test was not significant for 11 participants which means
that the decision threshold of these participants were not significantly different from the optimal value. Also,
8 participants used lower than optimal and 7 participants used higher than optimal threshold in the last 5
10In each step of the Markov chain governing the canoe movement, the canoe moves 45 pixels in one direction. This is why
we have used 45 pixels to test if the participant has used 0 decision threshold for the hard trials.
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Figure 12: Change in decision threshold after each trial. If we denote the value of the decision
threshold at trial k by ak, each point in this figure represents ak+1 − ak. A positive value of change means
that the participant has increased her decision threshold. Trial time is the total time of a trial. Here, k is
not the actual trial index. Instead, it indexes the trials from the same condition. The data points are plotted
separately for positive and negative values of reward in each condition. The rewards in the easy conditions
are ±20 and they are ±1 for the hard trials. See the text for more details.
blocks of trials.
3.3. Comparison of computational models of experiment A
We attempted to characterize the participants’ learning by fitting 10 computational models to the be-
havioral data. The models are summarized in Table 1. All models were fitted to each participant’s data
separately. We do not expect that all participants use the same learning mechanism. Some participants
may not adjust their decision threshold during the experiment. Therefore, it is important to examine which
model can explain each participant’s data the best.
The results of the model fitting and comparison are depicted in Figures 13 and 14 and Table 3.The top
row of Figure 13 shows the number of participants for which each model has been the best model based on
both the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Based on both
measures of the goodness of fit, the RL model with time-varying decision thresholds is the best model for
most of the participants.
One way to compare the models is to treat BIC/AIC as the log model evidence for each participant and
investigate if there is a significant difference between the BIC (AIC) for a pair of models. The average (across
35
participants) difference between BIC of Model 0 and Model 9 (RL model with time-varying thresholds) was
131 which was significantly greater than 0 (t25 = 4.23, p = 0.0002). This difference was BIC1−BIC9 = 42.96
(t25 = 2.56, p = 0.017) for Model 1 versus Model 9, and BIC3−BIC9 = 4.18 (t25 = 0.77, p = 0.44). However,
AIC3 − AIC9 = 15.50 (t25 = 2.84, p = 0.008). In words, based on AIC Model 9 performed significantly
better than Model 3, but the difference between the models is not significant based on BIC. The average of
the difference between the BIC/AIC of each model to Model 0 is shown in Figure 14. It can be seen that all
models perform strongly better than this baseline model.
We can compute this difference for each pair of the models. However, this needs many pairwise compar-
isons. Another problem is that the results based on AIC and BIC are not consistent to some extent: based
on AIC, there is much stronger evidence that model 9 is the best model. Part of the problem is that we
are comparing 10 models and this makes the comparisons to be affected more by possible outlier values in
BIC or AIC. A more sophisticated approach for comparing this number of models have been proposed by
Stephan et al. (2009). In this method, the models are considered as random variables. The probabilities that
the data of a participant chosen at random is generated by each model form a multinomial distribution. The
parameters of this distribution are described by a Dirichlet distribution. Stephan et al. proposed a simple
variational algorithm to estimate the parameters of this distribution (see Stephan et al. (2009) equation
14). Given the parameters of the Dirichlet distribution, it is possible to compute the probability that a
model is more likely than any other model. This is called the exceedance probability (EP). To compute these
probabilities, it is necessary to have an estimate of the marginal likelihood of each model m for the data
set D, i.e. p(D|m). The EPs for all 10 models, using BIC and AIC as the estimate for log(p(D|m)), are
shown in the bottom row of Figure 1311. Based on both AIC and BIC as the estimate, the RL model with
time-varying thresholds is the most likely model. The EP values based on AIC, strongly support this model.
The EP value based on BIC is 0.53 for this model, and 0.21 and 0.23 for models 1 and 3, respectively.
An important point that is consistent among all these analyses is that for each class of models, the time-
varying version of the model performs better than the time-constant version. The PEs for all models with
time-constant thresholds, based on both AIC and BIC, is almost zero. If a participant is using time-varying
thresholds but we fit a time-constant threshold model to her data, the residuals between the observed canoe
position (at the time that the participants has responded) in each trial and the predictions of model will be a
function of the reaction time in the trials. For example suppose that the participant has used time-decreasing
decision thresholds. In this case, the observed canoe positions for trials with short reaction times will be
larger than those with longer reaction times. Now if we fit a model with time-constant threshold, the best
fitted value of the decision threshold will be smaller than the true decision threshold for short reaction times,
11To compute PEs, we used the MATLAB code developed by Samuel J. Gershman and available at . See Gershman (2016)
for more details.
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Figure 13: Comparison of the computational models of experiment A. Top row: the number of
participants (out of 26) for which each model was the best among all 10 models. Bottom row: the protected
exceedance probabilities for each model. The comparisons are based on AIC and BIC in the left and right
panels respectively.
and larger than the true decision threshold for longer reaction times. Therefore, the residuals between the
observed canoe positions in each trial and this best fitted value will be a function of the reaction time.
The residuals between the observed canoe position in each trial and the predictions of models 8 and
9 as a function of the reaction time are shown in Figure 15 (for all trials from all participants). A fitted
linear model and spline smoother are also shown in this figure. Model 8 and 9 are the time-constant and
time-varying variants of the RL model. Among models with time-constant threshold, Model 8 has the lowest
AIC and BIC (see Table 3). As it can be seen, the residuals for model 8 are a function of the reaction time
while this is not the case for model 9. The slope in the fitted linear model for the residuals of Model 8 is
-3.73 and significantly lower than zero (p < 2e − 16). For the residuals of Model 9 the slope is -0.468 and
is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.15). This provides another evidence favoring the models with
time-varying thresholds over the models with time-constant threshold.
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Figure 14: Bayes factors for each model versus Model 0 in Experiment A. The vertical axis is
−2 log BayesFactor estimated by the difference between the AIC (left) and BIC (right) of each model and
Model 0. The color of the bars indicates if the model uses time-constant (C) or time-varying (V) decision
thresholds. The models are grouped into 4 categories. Baseline: models 0 and 1. Accuracy: models 2 and
3. Reward: models 5 and 6. RL: models RLC and RLV . See Table 1. As it can be seen, for each category,
the time-varying version performed much better than the time-constant version. Also, all models performed
significantly better than Model 0.
One reason that the results from AIC and BIC are partly inconsistent could be that the number of
the free parameters of the models is large relative to the number of the trials (between 350-450 trials for
different participants). To examine this possibility more, we ran 2 more male participants for three sessions
of Experiment A. The first session consisted of 40 blocks and the other two sessions consisted of 35 blocks.
Each session was held in one day and there were not more than 2 days gap between the sessions. All other
task parameters were exactly the same as for the one-session version of the experiment.
We fitted models 1, 3 and 9 to the data of these participants. participants 1 and 2 experienced 957 and
1026 trials during the three sessions, respectively. The values of the negative log-likelihood, AIC and BIC
are presented in Table 4. Interestingly, for both participants the RL model with time-varying thresholds is
the best model based on both AIC and BIC.
The observed values of the canoe position in each trial (observed decision threshold), together with the
predicted values of the decision threshold from Models 3 and 9 are shown in Figure 16 for the two participants
in this experiment. As it can be seen, Model 9 fits the data much better. Specifically, for the easy trials,
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Table 3: Goodness of fit of computational models of Experiment A
Model NLL AIC BIC
0 1735(51.7) 3478 3493
1 1673(47.3) 3367 3404
2 1697(49.5) 3415 3453
3 1636(46.2) 3305 3366
4 1632(45.8) 3301 3369
5 1690(48.7) 3408 3461
6 1631(45.8) 3302 3377
7 1632(45.4) 3300 3368
RLC 1681(48.8) 3389 3438
RLV 1626(45.7) 3290 3361
note: The numbers in the parentheses are
standard errors. NLL=negative log likeli-
hood.
Table 4: Goodness of fit of models 1,3 and 9 for three session version of Experiment A
participant Model NLL AIC BIC
1 4887 9794 9843
1 3 4815 9666 9754
RLV 4765 9569 9662
1 4765 9550 9599
2 3 4434 8905 8994
RLV 4402 8843 8936
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Figure 15: Residuals between observed value of decision threshold and predicted values by
Models 8 and 9. The data is for all participants and all trials. The blue line shows the best fitted linear
model to the data and the red line shows the fitted spline smoother. The residuals for Model 8 decrease as
reaction time increases.
Model 3 tries to capture the “general trend” in the data and has not been able to capture more subtle
changes in the decision thresholds. We observed similar patterns in the behavior of the fitted thresholds in
Model 3, for some of the participants in the one-session version of the experiment (For example compare the
left most column of Figures 3 and Figure 5 in S1 Text). By investigating Figures 16 and Figures 3 and 4 in
S1 Text, it seems that this model, in general, does not have enough complexity to be able to capture many
of the observed patterns in the data.
3.4. Behavioral results of experiment B
This experiment consisted of 35 blocks of trials. The crucial difference between this experiment and
Experiment A is that here there is no cue indicating the condition of the upcoming trial. Therefor, if
the participant sets her decision threshold at the beginning of each trial, she must use the same decision
threshold for both easy and hard trials. On the other hand, the participant may use a mechanism to detect
the condition of the trial first and then sets her decision threshold.
The decision thresholds, reaction times and accuracy, averaged across all 20 participants, are shown in
Figure 17. As it can be seen in this figure, the decision threshold decreases in both easy and hard trials.
Interestingly, on average, the decision thresholds for the easy and hard conditions are different. The linear
mixed-effect analysis of the decision threshold (with block number and condition as regressors and considering
block number as the random effect) showed that the decision thresholds were significantly different in the
easy and hard conditions (p < 0.0001). Also, the reduction in the decision threshold is significant in both
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Figure 16: Observed and predicted values of decision threshold in 3-sessions of Experiment A.
The two participants participated in three sessions of Experiment A. The black circles are the observed
values of the decision threshold. The red and green curves are the predictions of Model 9 and Model 3 of
the decision thresholds, respectively.
conditions (p = 0.0091), but it is not different between the conditions (p = 0.0829).
It is important to note that the difference between the decision thresholds for the easy and hard trials,
observed in Figure 17, does not necessarily imply that the participants are using two different decision
thresholds for these two conditions. A single time-decreasing decision threshold for all trials can also explain
the pattern observed in this figure. Since in the hard trials the probability that the canoe moves to the
correct direction is lower, on average it takes longer for the canoe to get away from the center of the screen.
Therefore, if a participant uses a time-decreasing threshold, in most of the hard trials, the canoe will not
reach the threshold position in a short course of time, and so the mean RT will be higher and the decision
threshold will be lower for the hard trials. To clarify this, the result of simulating the canoe position using
two values of P0 (the probability that the canoe moves to the correct direction in each time step), together
with an example of a time-decreasing threshold is shown in Figure 18. For the red paths, P0 = 0.99 and
for the green paths P0 = 0.5. As it can be seen, most of the red (which correspond to the easy trials)
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paths reach the threshold around 5 secs, when the value of the decision threshold is high. Most of the
green paths, on the other hand, reach the threshold later when the decision threshold has decreased. This
shows that the patter of RT and decision thresholds observed in Figure 17 can be accounted for by a single
time-decreasing decision threshold. Therefore, we need more sophisticated methods to distinguish between
a single-threshold and two-threshold hypotheses. In the next section, we use computational modeling to
investigate this question more rigorously.
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Figure 17: Results of Experiment B. Left: mean position of the canoe at the time the participant made
her decision. Middle: mean RT. Right: accuracy. E: easy trials. H: hard trials. The bars indicate standard
error.
3.5. Comparison of computational models of experiment B
Our goal here is to compare two hypotheses. Based on the first hypothesis, the participants set their
decision threshold at the beginning of each trial and before the trial starts. Since there is no cue presented
at this time, the participants have to use the same decision threshold for both the easy and hard trials.
This assumption has been made in previous research Ratcliff et al. (1999); Ratcliff (2002); Ratcliff & Smith
(2004). Importantly, in Experiment B, the optimal behavior is also to use one decision threshold for both
types of trials. For the task parameters used for this experiment (rewards, delay penalties, inter-stimulus
intervals and so on) this optimal threshold is a time-decreasing function of the elapsed time in a trial. Based
on the second hypothesis, in each trial the participant first attempts to recognize the difficulty level of the
current trial, and then sets different decision thresholds based on the detected difficulty level.
To compare these two hypotheses, we fitted computational models corresponding to each hypothesis and
examine which model can account for the data better. The computational models corresponding to each
hypothesis are summarized in Table 2. Models M1H1 , M
2
H1
and M2H1 all assume that the participants use only
one threshold for both easy and hard trials. The threshold is modeled as the Weibull function. The difference
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Figure 18: Simulated canoe paths. The red paths correspond to the easy trials with P0 = 0.99 and
the green paths correspond to the hard trials with P0 = 0.5. To make the figure visually clearer, we have
added Gaussian noise to each path. The black curves are obtained from a Weibull function (Equation 9)
with parameters ψ = 500, ψ′ = −200, λ = 12, φ = 4.5. Most of the red paths reached the decision threshold
around 5 secs when the decision threshold is large, while most of the green paths reached the decision
threshold later when its value has decreased. This shows that even with a single time-decreasing decision
threshold, the observed values of the decision threshold for the hard trials will be lower than in the easy
trials.
between these models is in the way the threshold is updated. In M1H1 there is no learning mechanism, while
in M2H1 the experiment is modeled as an one-state SMDP and the parameters of the decision thresholds are
updated using a variant of the REINFORCE algorithm (Equation 6). In M2H1 the experiment is modeled as
a two-state SMDP but the available action in both states (the decision threshold) is the same. In MH2 , the
model based on the second hypothesis, the experiment is modeled as an SMDP with two states corresponding
to the two types of trials, easy and hard. In each trial, if the canoe position reaches a threshold aD before
an internal deadline tD, the participant recognizes the trial as easy and sets her decision thresholds at ±aE .
Otherwise, the trial is considered to be hard and the participant uses thresholds ±aH . The value of these
thresholds are updated using an RL algorithm. See Materials and Methods section for more details.
The number of participants for which each model was the best and the exceedance probabilities (EP)
based on both AIC and BIC for the three models are shown in Figure 19. Model MH2 is the best model
for 18 and 17 participants out of 20, based on AIC and BIC, respectively. The EPs based on both AIC and
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BIC are almost 1 for this model and 0 for the models based on the first hypothesis. NLL, AIC and BIC of
the models averaged across all participants are presented in Table 5. These results together strongly suggest
that the participants use a mechanism to detect the difficulty of the trial first and then set the corresponding
decision threshold. Next, we examine the properties of the fitted model MH2 more.
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Figure 19: Comparison of the computational models of experiment B. Top row: the number of
participants (out of 20) for which each model was the best among all 4 models. Bottom: PEs for all models.
In each row, the left panel is based on AIC and the right panel is based on BIC.
The first question that may arise is how accurate participants are in detecting the trials difficulty. The top
panel of Figure 20 shows the probability of correctly detecting the difficulty of a trial for each difficulty level
for all participants. To generate this figure, we fitted model MH2 to obtain tD and aD for each participant.
Then, for each participant, we computed the probabilities of correctly detecting the difficulty given the
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Table 5: Goodness of fit of computational models of Experiment B
Model NLL AIC BIC
M1H1 1862(53.8) 3734 3754
M2H1 1821(51.5) 3661 3696
M3H1 1827(52.9) 3679 3726
MH2 1772(52.8) 3570 3620
note: The numbers in the parentheses are
standard errors.
canoe path that the participant experienced in each trial and the estimated values of tD and aD for that
participant. As we can see, most of the participants are much more accurate in detecting the easy trials
than the hard trials. Specifically, for many participants the probability of correctly detecting a hard trial is
less than 0.5. This means that these participants tended to detect a trial as easy more than hard.
The bottom panel of Figure 20 shows the average of the difficulty detection threshold (aD) together with
the average of the decision thresholds for the two types of trials (aE and aH) at the beginning and end of the
experiment. This figure is plotted as follows: For each participant, we first simulated model MH2 with the
best fitted values of the parameters for that participant. This results in a predicted value of the mean of the
decision thresholds, ms,k, for each trial k. Then, we computed the median of these predicted values for the
first and last 20 trials in the experiment for each participant. The figure shows the mean and the standard
error of these median values across all participants. It is important to note that in MH2 we assume that the
participants do not adjust the difficulty detection threshold and so its value is the same for the first and last
20 trials in the figure. As it can be seen in this figure, the mean of the Gaussian representing the threshold
in the easy trials, mE,k, is much larger than that of the hard trials, mH,k. The mean in both conditions
decrease with experience. Also, at the beginning of the experiment, the value of mE,k is close to aD and it
becomes smaller than aD by experience.
The estimated value of the parameter tD (the internal deadline for detecting trial as easy) is 5.37 (with
standard error of 0.55). This value is larger than the participants’ average reaction time (middle panel of
Figure 17). Together, these results show that the participants used a conservative strategy. By using a
large values of tD and aD they detected most of the trials as easy trial and used higher decision thresholds
for those trials. Given that the stakes for the easy trials were higher than the hard trials, this strategy is
reasonable.
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Figure 20: Analysis of fitted model MH2 . Top: each participant’s accuracy in detecting the difficulty
level of the hard (H) and easy (E) trials. Bottom: Median of the difficulty detection threshold (D) and
the thresholds in the easy (E) and hard (H) trials averaged across all participants. These quantities are
computed for the first and last 20 trials for each participant to show the effect of learning.
4. Discussion
When a sequence of decisions should be made during a limited time interval, the total outcome depends
not only on the outcome of each decision, but also on the time spent on each decision on average. If the
decisions have different properties, the decision maker should decide how much time to spend on each decision
in order to achieve the maximum outcome. Little is know about how human and animals allocate limited
time to decisions with different properties.
In this paper, we reported the results of two experiments to investigate this question. In both experiments,
the total duration of the experiment was fixed and the number of the trials that a participant could experience
depended on her speed in responding. Two types of trials were intermixed randomly in each block of the
experiments: easy trials with larger absolute value of positive and negative rewards (for correct and incorrect
decisions), and hard trials with smaller values of positive and negative rewards. We used a novel stimulus, the
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canoe movement detection task, which enabled us to observe the participants’ decision thresholds directly. We
used computational modeling to examine several aspects of the decision making process in these experiments.
In what follows, we discuss our findings in each of these, separately.
4.1. Allocation of limited time to decisions with different outcome
In the previous studies that investigated the optimal speed-accuracy trade-off, all trials in each block
were of the same type Simen et al. (2009); Balci et al. (2011); Karlar et al. (2014). Our experimental design
can be considered as an extension to these paradigms in that here the amount of time a participant should
allocate to one type of decision to achieve the optimal performance, depends on the task parameters for all
types of decisions.
While we were writing this paper, another group of researchers, independently, reported their results on
two experiments similar to what we reported here Oud et al. (2016). Specifically, in study 2 in that paper,
participants performed a perceptual decision making task in which the hard and easy trials were presented
randomly in blocks with fixed duration. Also, the hard trials were associated with lower stakes than the
easy trials. In both experiments, no cue was presented to the participants. Their results showed that the
participants were slower in the hard trials than the easy trials. They concluded that the participants are
spending too much time on hard trials which have low relative reward and so the behavior is sup-optimal.
To provide stronger evidence for sub-optimality, they introduced an intervention in some blocks: in some
randomly chosen trials of these blocks, the participants were motivated to make their choice faster. The
results showed that in these intervention blocks, the participants achieved more rewards than the normal
blocks, which shows that the participants are too slow when there is no intervention and so sub-optimal.
Although these results show that the participants are sub-optimal, they do not necessarily show that
the participants are spending too much time in only the hard trials. Since in both of their experiments the
hard and easy trials are intermixed with no cue presented, the participants may have adopted a single time-
decreasing optimal threshold. As we showed (see Figure 18), in this case, although the behavior is optimal,
the RT in the hard trials will be larger than the easy trials. Even if the participants adopt two different
decision thresholds, and even if the threshold for the hard condition is lower than the easy condition, it is
still possible to observe slower RT for hard trial just because the rate of information accumulation in the
hard trials is lower.
Also, as the results of our study A showed, some participants are faster than optimal and some others
are slower than optimal. The intervention introduced by Oud et al. (2016) can be useful for slower than
optimal participants but will hurt the performance of the faster than optimal participants. They reported
that in their perceptual decision making task, the intervention was beneficial for 60% of the participants.
Since in their experiment it was not possible to observe the decision thresholds directly, it is not possible to
explain why this is the case.
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An interesting pattern that we observed in Experiment A, is that most of the participants used lower
than optimal threshold (assuming that the threshold is time-constant) at the beginning of the experiment
(see Figure 11). This means that these participants paid less attention to time than their accuracy. This is
in contrast to some previous findings which showed that the participants used higher than optimal decision
thresholds Simen et al. (2009); Balci et al. (2011). The experiments used in these papers and in the current
paper differ in several ways and so it is hard to decide why our results are not consistent with the results of
these papers. Currently, we are conducting experiments similar to Experiment A but with the random dot
motion as the stimulus to investigate this more.
4.2. Shape of decision thresholds
We showed that in Experiment A, the optimal threshold for both the easy and hard trials is time-constant
for most of the trial duration and decreases rapidly afterwards (left panel of Figure 9). To examine the shape
of the decision thresholds that the participants adopted in this experiment, we fitted two versions of each
computational model: one with time-constant thresholds and one with time-varying thresholds in which the
threshold was modeled as a Weibull function. The results of comparing the models provided strong evidence
favoring time-varying thresholds: for all participants and all models, the time-varying version of the model
fitted better than the time-constant version. Most of the participants used time-decreasing boundaries with
a shape different from the optimal thresholds (Figure 7 in S1 Text).
Time-decreasing thresholds are becoming more popular among researchers mostly because of two sources
of evidence. First, recent neurophysiological findings support the notion of an “urgency signal” to make a
decision as time elapses in a trial Churchland et al. (2008). This signal can be considered as being equivalent
to time-decreasing thresholds Thura et al. (2012). Second, time-decreasing thresholds arise as the optimal
solution in several experimental designs (e.g., deffered decision making with limited resourced to purchase
information Busemeyer & Rapoport (1988), perceptual decision making with deadline Frazier & Yu (2008),
perceptual decision making with mixed levels of difficulty and without cue Drugowitsch et al. (2012)).
Despite this popularity, the behavioral evidence supporting these models is less prevalent. To the best of
our knowledge, the most comprehensive comparison between the time-constant and time-decreasing models
is provided by two recent papers by Hawkins et al. Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen et al. Voskuilen et al.
(2016). Model comparison results of Hawkins et al. (2015) showed that the time-constant thresholds were
preferred over the time-decreasing thresholds for most of the participants. Consistent with these results,
Voskuilen et al. (2016) found that the time-constant thresholds provide better fit to the data. In addition,
the fitted time-varying thresholds were very similar to the time-constant thresholds because the amount of
decrease in the threshold was very small.
The difference between our results and the results found by these papers could have several reasons. First,
the stimuli used were different in these studies. Hawkins et al. (2015) used random dot motion task, brightness
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discrimination task, and dot separation task. Voskuilen et al. (2016) used numerosity discrimination task
and the random dot motion task. In all these experiments, the decision thresholds are not observable directly
and their properties should be inferred from the choice and reaction time data. In contrast, in our canoe
movement detection task, we inferred the shape of the decision threshold directly from the time series of the
observed values of the decision thresholds in each trial. Another important difference is that the reaction
time in the studies used in Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen et al. (2016) is lower than in our experiment.
For example, the median reaction time in all conditions of all 6 experiments reported in Voskuilen et al.
(2016) is less than 0.8 secs, while the median reaction time in the easy condition of Experiments A of the
current paper is more than 3 secs (middle panel of Figure 10). This difference is important because if the
participants have to make their decisions very quickly, they may not have enough time to decrease their
decision threshold.
Second, in experiments reported in Hawkins et al. (2015) and Voskuilen et al. (2016) the participants
do not receive reward based on their performance. In contrast, in our experiments the participants are
motivated to spend not too much time on each trial. Therefore, even in the easy trials, the participants
needed less information to make their decisions as the time elapsed in a trial. Although, as we showed, this
strategy was not optimal.
4.3. Optimal decision threshold
We chose the parameters of Experiment A such that the optimal strategy for the hard trials was to respond
as quickly as possible (zero threshold). Our statistical analysis showed that 12 out of 26 participants did
not learn this simple strategy by the end of the experiment. Also, for the easy trials, some participants used
higher than optimal and some others used lower than optimal decision thresholds. In Experiment B, the
participants behaved sub-optimally by detecting the difficulty of the trial first and then setting the decision
threshold. Sub-optimal behavior has been reported in some previous studies of the speed-accuracy trade-off.
Simen et al. (2009) found that the participants used higher than optimal decision thresholds. Also, the results
of Karlar et al. (2014) showed that in experiments with deadline, where the optimal decision threshold is
time-decreasing, the participants did not decrease their decision threshold within a trial. One reason for this
sub-optimality could be the lack of enough practice. Balci et al. (2011) showed that with extensive practice
(about 14 sessions) the participants’ decision threshold became closer to the optimal values.
Every conclusion about the optimality should be made with caution. In all these studies, the optimality is
defined with respect to the actual value of the reward that a participant can earn. However, it is well-known
that the subjective values of positive and negative rewards could be dramatically different from the actual
values. If, for example, the absolute subjective value of negative rewards is larger than that of equal positive
rewards, then the “subjective optimal threshold” will be higher than the value of the decision threshold that
maximizes the actual reward. In addition, we showed that in our experiments, the cost of time is equal to
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the average reward rate. The participants, however, may consider a subjective value for the cost of time.
This will also change the shape and value of the optimal decision threshold. In a recent paper, Fudenberg
et al. Fudenberg et al. (2015) proved (theorem 6 in that paper) that for a diffusion process with arbitrary
time-varying decision thresholds ±b(t), it is always possible to find a function c(t) as the cost of time, such
that ±b(t) is optimal in the sense that it leads to minimum value of the total cost. In other words, any
observed decision threshold could be considered as optimal for a specific cost function.
4.4. Adjusting decision threshold
The main goal of this paper was to investigate how the participants adjust their decision threshold on
a trial by trial basis. To this end, we proposed and compare several computational models for learning the
decision thresholds. The results of the model comparison for Experiment A showed that the proposed RL
model is the most likely model for most of the participants. However, based on the BIC of the fitted models,
for some of the participants the model with no leaning (Model 1) and the model in which the learning is
based only on the rewards (Model 3), provided better fit. Of course we do not expect that all participants
use the same learning mechanism. The interesting result here is that although the RL model has a large
number of parameters, it was the best model for many participants even based on BIC (which penalizes the
complexity of a model more than AIC for large sample sizes).
Models 2-4 are based on the assumption that the participants adjust their decision threshold only based
on the rewards they receive in each trial. Based on the values of the subjective rewards, these models can
predict different patterns in the data. For example, if the absolute subjective value of the negative reward is
smaller than the subjective value of the positive reward, these models predict that the participant reduces
her decision threshold to zero for the hard trials in Experiment A. This is because the participant decreases
her decision threshold after each correct trial and increases it after each incorrect trial. However, since the
subjective value of positive rewards is higher, the amount of decrease is larger than increase and thus overall
the decision threshold decreases. The results of the model comparison based on BIC, showed that one version
of these models, Model 3, can explain the data of some of the participants better than other models.
The heuristic models which assume the participants adjust their decision thresholds to achieve a desired
level of accuracy (Models 5 and 6), or reaction time and accuracy (Model 7) did not win for any of the
participants. Model 7 is an important competitor to the RL models. As we mentioned earlier, for an one-
state SMDP this model is equivalent to the RL model. Therefore, to be able to distinguish these models, we
need at least a two-state experiment. Model 7 was inspired by the computational models of categorization
Nosofsky (1986), and multi-attribute decision making Roe et al. (2001). In this model, if we set wt = wa = 1,
the learning rule in Equation 22 will reduce to ∆ms,k = αa · rk +αt ·dk + cs, where rk and dk are the reward
and the time in trial k. This term resembles the TD error (Equation 5) in the RL models. The difference
is that the last term for computing ∆ms,k is constant, cs, while in computing TD error we should use
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Vˆk(s
′) − Vˆk(s). This term, which is the difference between the value of the current and the next state, is
unique to the RL model. Model 7 is an instance of a “supervised learning” algorithm: the desired values of
the accuracy and reaction time are given and the participant should adjust her threshold to achieve these
values. In contrast, in the RL model the desired levels are not known to the participant. In a sense, the
state values determine the desired values. Therefore, in the RL models the participant both estimates the
desired values and tries to reach those values simultaneously.
4.5. Effect of cue presentation
Experiment B was designed to test the hypothesis that the participants set their decision threshold before
the trial starts. In contrast to this hypothesis, the results of model comparison provided evidence for a model
in which the participants first detect the difficulty of a trial and then set the corresponding decision threshold.
To the best of our knowledge, in all previous applications of the sequential sampling models, if trials
with different levels of difficulty were intermixed, it was assumed that the participants use the same decision
threshold for all trials, and the only parameter that varies between trials is the rate of information accu-
mulation (drift rate) Ratcliff et al. (1999); Ratcliff (2002); Ratcliff & Smith (2004). Again, we can think
of two reasons for the inconsistency between the results of the previous studies and what we found in the
current paper: first, short mean reaction times in these studies which does not give the participants enough
time to first detect the difficulty of the stimulus, and second, since in the previous studies the participants
are not rewarded based on their performance, they are not motivated to use different decision thresholds for
different levels of difficulty.
4.6. Limitations
The experiments considered in this paper correspond to simple SMDPs. In particular, the transition
probabilities are not a function of the actions taken by the participant. More research is necessary to
investigate if the RL models can account for the participants data in more complicated environments Hotaling
et al. (2015).
Another limitation of the current paper is that we have only applied our models to the data from the
canoe task. It is interesting to investigate if the same results will be obtained if we use more conventional
stimuli like the random dot motion task. The main issue is that since in these tasks the decision threshold
is not observable directly, the learning models should be augmented with sequential sampling models. This
makes the model fitting more complicated. We are currently working on this problem.
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